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COLD WAR CONFLICT:  
AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN GREECE

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
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


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## Dedication

To my wife Kathy, and my children Nickolas and Christina, without whom this degree, indeed this life, would be meaningless. They have stood by me always, offering support, guidance, and love--I could never hope for better teammates in life;

and

To my mother and father who long ago instilled in me notions of service and duty to country, and who gave me an ethical and moral code by which to conduct my life. In addition, they passed on to me a great respect and love of Hellenism, and pride in my Greek roots. I can never repay them for all they have given me.

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I would be remiss if I did not mention the other two-thirds of the "Mediterranean connection"--the Catena and Mastrovito families--whose friendship has been fun, helpful, and inspiring.

After studying the period of 1945-1949 in great detail, I feel compelled to remember, and note, those American leaders in government and the military who persevered in a time of great peril, confusion, and unknown to identify the "national interest," and thus, preserve and protect this great nation. Their foresight and intuition have been borne-out in light of the recent world metamorphosis and the downfall of communism. In retrospect they (we) were right all along!!!

Finally, a special thanks must go to the American soldier who has executed the difficult missions called for by American policy makers. He has done so without complaint, without question, and to the very best of his ability...many times making the ultimate sacrifice in the process. As General Sam Walker once said, "Foreign Policy is like a great big funnel. At the top is poured in grand strategy, policies, doctrines, ideologies, and the national interest....and out of the bottom comes a single Private First Class walking point with an M16 rifle." As a soldier, my profession is centered on this "Private First Class" and those like him, and I know that they are the best this nation has to offer.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter I: Prelude to American Involvement	6
- Background	7
- Resistance Organizations	11
- Round One of the Civil War	18
- Round Two of the Civil War	21
Chapter II: Transition to the Truman Doctrine	33
- US-Soviet Relations	37
- US-Greece, A Growing Interest	43
- Growing American Frustration	48
- Initial American Involvement	52
- Great Britain's Withdrawal	63
- The Truman Doctrine	68
Chapter III: American Political Involvement	81
- Background	84
- Greek-Turkish Aid Bill	85
- AMAG Directives	93
- AMAG in Greece	98
Chapter IV: American Military Involvement	121
- USAGG	125
- JUSMAPG-Greece	136
Conclusion	154
Bibliography	169
Curriculum Vitae	---

## INTRODUCTION

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The decade of 1940 to 1949 in Greece was perhaps the most tragic period in the history of that nation. Occupied by the Axis powers from 1941 to 1944, it suffered greatly at their hands. Immediately following the liberation of Greece, the country was thrown into a brutal civil war that further contributed to its destruction, but this time at the hands of the Greeks themselves. It was this dark period that would so profoundly influence Greece over the next 40 years. Additionally, this period was characterized by an important shift in Mediterranean hegemony, and a realignment of foreign policy objectives for most democratic powers, most notably the United States. Via the Truman Doctrine, American presence in Greece became a reality, giving Great Britain the opportunity to abruptly exit the stage. It was indeed a turning point.

On a small scale, political events in postwar Greece highlighted the struggle of left versus right that was taking place in other West European countries. In Greece however, the conflict was much more deadly. The Civil War also had international implications. The situation in Greece in 1945 was a microcosm of the battle that was heating up between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Greek Civil War would catapult the world into the cold war age, symbolizing its bipolar dimensions. While the remainder of the world was celebrating victory and embarking on programs of reconstruction, the next 50 years of cold war--the east-west schism--was being played out on the small corner stage of Greece. For the Greeks however, the



Civil War was more than just a fight between monolithic communism and the democratic forces of the west. It was an event that would leave a very deep and personal scar. It did not begin at the end of World War II, but rather was the culmination of a long developmental stage that brought Greece to a decision point: monarchy, dictatorship, or democracy.

This long developmental stage dated back to the birth of the modern Greek state, and indeed included all the accumulated "baggage" of 120 years of foreign power intervention, distrust of the Monarchy, deep ideological disagreement, party fragmentation and lack of organization, political aristocracy, and the negative aspects of personality-oriented parties. This study will concentrate on the topic of foreign power intervention, more specifically, on American involvement between the years 1944-1949. For Greece, these years constituted the greatest and most sustained period of foreign interference in the 20th century, and had a profound impact on the future of the country. I have examined American intervention from the time just prior to the Truman Doctrine to the completion of the Civil War, and have done so in the context of the American perceptions of the Greek political system.

The purpose of this study is threefold: to gain an understanding of the role America has played in Greece; to understand how the initial American perceptions of the Greek leaders and their political system influenced U.S. policy into the 1980's; and to examine the evolution of American foreign

policy in the postwar 20th century, using the Truman Doctrine and US intervention in Greece as a model. In order to do this one must first look at the defining years of American involvement--the immediate postwar period--to have a basis of understanding of both American penetration in Greece, and the impact that it has had on the country and the Cold War.

The importance of this study lies in the research and analysis of America's early years as a world power, and the impact of its actions on Greece. Was U.S. control and penetration the result of well-planned realpolitik policy in the face of new geopolitical realities? Was it an honest attempt to assist the Greek nation in a moral crusade? Or was America simply stumbling through its first steps in exercising its responsibilities as a new world power? In every country's history there is a certain point in time that separates the old life from the new, the old ways from the new ways. For both America and Greece, this was one of those periods. It was a watershed. In the wake of recently declassified documents on the subject, and numerous revisionist studies, I hope to add another dimension to this fascinating period of American diplomatic history.

This study will cover the initial stages of American involvement in the affairs of Greece, and will include a brief background to the period. Additionally, it will cover the transition of power from Great Britain to the United States, and the subsequent total penetration of Greece via the Truman Doctrine, resulting in economic, military, and political aid.

Finally, I will examine the impact of American involvement and influence in Greece, and its implications for the Cold War, Greek politics, and Greek-American relations. In the following four chapters I will attempt to show that American intervention in Greece, while damaging to that country's institutions in the short-term, provided for democratic development and stability in the long-term. I will also explain that the American intervention was, in a great degree, largely influenced by the poor perceptions of the Greek leaders and the Greek Government, and that continued American policy was further shaped by those perceptions. In order to count the Greek aid program as a success, the United States had to gain a total victory over the communist guerrillas, effect political stabilization, and initiate economic reconstruction. It felt that success could not be assured without total penetration of the Greek State.

Sources for this study included both primary and secondary works. A great deal of attention went to declassified government documents, specifically, Department of State volumes on foreign relations. Additionally, memoirs of some key individuals were of significant importance in clarifying many issues throughout the research process.

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## CHAPTER ONE

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### PRELUDE TO AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

The Greek Civil War cannot be understood simply by looking at the years 1947-1949. In fact, one must go back to the time period immediately following the War of Independence to fully grasp the setting in which the Civil War unfolded. The Greek condition in the 1940's was the outcome of years, even centuries, of institutional development, coupled with the devastation of occupation, and World War Two. To cover the evolution of the different Greek institutions would, of course, be impossible to do, given the time and space constraints for this chapter. However, this first chapter will instead endeavor to recount the directly applicable events that led up to American entry into the Greek Civil War. This will provide the reader with a background sufficient enough from which to depart on an examination of American involvement.

## **BACKGROUND**

The roots of the Greek Civil War lay in the resistance movement that sprouted immediately after German occupation, and with the political machinations that accompanied it. The resistance was defined by many different groups, but can be most easily categorized into two camps: the right, or pro-royalist/republican forces, and those of the left, identified as communists. At the outset there was a center, but it quickly became blurred, and finally disappeared as the fight for political survival became a reality.

The United States' involvement in Greece was at this time very limited. With Great Britain in control of southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, the US had no real interest there. The extent of American involvement in Greek affairs was mostly expressed through the work of the American Ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, who had been appointed to the post in 1933 by President Roosevelt. Most American interest in Greece, both official and unofficial, was manifested in different Grecophile movements that had waxed and waned since the rebirth of classical studies during the 19th century. MacVeagh himself was a classicist from Harvard, a publicist-cum-diplomat, who was more a student of ancient Hellenic history than of modern Greece. His self-stated qualification for Ambassador was that "The Greeks are my passion in life."<sup>1</sup> This, coupled with the fact that he was a close personal friend of the President, helped MacVeagh pioneer American involvement in Greece. His reign at the US embassy covered the momentous period of American involvement, thus, some of his initial perceptions, and insight, helped to form the American perception of Greece.

The background history that set the stage for the Civil War began with the birth of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in 1918. Although formed by dedicated communists made in the Soviet-Comintern mold, the party remained weak throughout the interwar years. Most of its support came from the displaced refugees of Asia Minor, and former socialists. In fact, party membership

never exceeded 2,500 during the twenties. It was very difficult for the Communist Party to appeal to the fiercely independent and nationalistic Greeks. For the most part, there was hardly a "proletariat" at that time. Greece was still largely an agrarian society. Additionally, most middle and lower class Greeks identified with the charismatic, liberal-Republican statesman, Venizelos. The Communist Party insistence on independence for Macedonia further alienated the people, as they saw this as "anti-ethnos." Finally, internal disputes and splits degraded the party's reputation.<sup>2</sup>

Ambassador MacVeagh was quick to recognize the communist threat, however remote, as early as 1936 when he drafted a report to the State Department explaining the Salonica tobacco riots. In his endeavor to explain the significance of the strike he afforded the communists, or rather the laborers, some sympathy, deriding the "upper class in Athens" (the government officials) in the process. Exhibiting great foresight he predicted:

"Indeed, the time seems clearly to have arrived when those who direct the destinies of Greece, ..... must give up living in the past and face the problems of the present. If they fail to do this resolutely and promptly, they and their country may well be the next victims of the social revolution."<sup>3</sup>

Along with his dire prediction, Macveagh's dispatch seems to already vent a certain amount of exasperation at the "political inertia" gripping the Athens government. In this same report he

goes on to comment on the government's lack of interest in the welfare of the lower class, especially in the region of Macedonia.

The years 1918 to 1936 were very unstable as the government alternated between Republic and Monarchy with the change usually resulting from a coup d'etat. The 1936 elections produced a deadlock between the Liberals (a republican center-right party), and the royalist, Popular Front. The few seats won by the Communist Party actually held the balance of power. With this in mind, the leader of the Popular Front, General Metaxas, persuaded the King to dissolve the assembly and give him dictatorial powers. The Metaxas regime was strong and efficient, but also ruthless, tyrannous, and repressive. He was equally hard on both the Liberals and the Communists, imprisoning or exiling many of his opponents. Additionally, Metaxas decimated the officer corps of the army, removing all those with known, or suspected, republican or communist sympathies.<sup>4</sup> Although the government maintained stability for the next five years, Metaxas increased the possibility of civil war by his oppressive policies.

In the opening months of 1940 the German blitzkrieg swept through Europe, and Italy occupied Albania. The Metaxas government tried desperately to remain neutral. Finally, in October 1940, Italy attacked Greece, but met very stiff resistance. For a short period the Greeks were unified in their effort. Although greatly outnumbered, the Greek army not only executed a successful defense, but pushed the Italian forces almost 50 kilometers back



into Albania.

During this period, President Roosevelt pledged full American support to the Greek people, and extended material aid to Greece.<sup>5</sup> In March of 1941 the US provided much needed Grumman fighter planes for the Greek Air Force, and the following month released a load of howitzers, mortars, and ammunition.<sup>6</sup> While American material aid came trickling into Greece, Great Britain was preparing to assist Greece with a contingent of troops.

This brief moment of glory ended six months later when the German Army overwhelmed the Greek and British defenders. The defeat was quick, with Greece capitulating to the Axis forces within 53 days. All of Greece was now under occupation.<sup>7</sup>

#### **RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS**

From the first moment, the unity that Greece had shown in war became unraveled under occupation. The speed with which the German Army had prosecuted the war and subdued Greece, and the untimely death of some key leaders created a tremendous leadership vacuum.<sup>8</sup> As in the other conquered countries of Europe, Greece set up two governments, one in exile, and the puppet government under the Germans. It was at this point that a third arm of quasi-government sprouted--the resistance movement.

The winter of 1941-1942 was one of extreme hardship in Greece. Ineffective leadership, coupled with a crumbling infrastructure, left the country in shambles. Industry had shut

down, imports and exports were suspended, inflation set in, and mass starvation followed. In reaction to the terrible conditions brought on by the oppressive policies of the occupiers, small bands of resistance fighters began to appear. Although these secret partisan organizations multiplied rapidly, they lacked organization, and the means for action. There were no experienced political parties that had the apparatus to support a resistance movement at that time. The years of dictatorship in Greece had stripped away an effective and enthusiastic opposition from the Greek political scene. Thus, the piecemeal fashion in which the guerrilla bands and political parties would spring to life, was a signal of the political squabbling that was to follow. The coming years would pit Greek against Greek, as each group fought for all, or a portion of the power and influence.

The far left was represented by the Communist Party. The KKE, who had persevered underground during the years it was outlawed, now saw an opportunity to act. Highly organized, and led by men experienced in clandestine activity, the KKE saw a chance to harness the uncoordinated, but growing resistance movement.<sup>9</sup> Its first act, together with two other small socialist parties, was to form the National Liberation Front (EAM), and its military arm, the Peoples National Liberation Army (ELAS) in September 1941. EAM became quite popular, especially among the youth, and indeed was the only real resistance movement operating in the early stages. The KKE was cognizant of the fact

that most Greeks were not interested in the heavy ideological baggage of communism, thus they embarked on a recruiting campaign with EAM as the "front."<sup>10</sup> The movement had two main goals: national survival and the seizing of power.

By January 1942 other resistance groups began to form. These partisan bands inclined towards the right of the political spectrum, but they were independent of each other. The strongest of these was the Greek National Democratic League (EDES), led in the field by Colonel Napoleon Zervas. Zervas was a former regular army officer who, as a staunch republican, had been imprisoned by the royalist dictatorship of Metaxas. The EDES political platform was built on negatives: anti-communism, anti-monarchism, and vehement opposition to external influences in Greek politics. It seems that this party was a knee-jerk reaction to the growing strength of the left. In fact, it became so overzealously anti-communist, that in time, the party became a dumping ground for all who opposed the extreme left, to include royalists, and even collaborators.<sup>11</sup> EDES was the only right wing movement to survive the four years of occupation. Although eventually defeated by ELAS in the opening round of the Civil War, it was a constant thorn in the side of both KKE/EAM, and the Germans.

Other lesser known and weaker resistance groups formed, and deserve mention only as a means to show the confusing situation that prevailed. Each of these groups and their leaders had an influence on the eventual outcome of the battle between left and right. They include: the socialist-republican National and Social

Liberation Party (EKKA), which was the third largest organization; the Panhellenic Liberating Organization (PAO); the "AAA" founded and led by George Papandreou; and the small but persistent "X," a right-wing extremist organization that supported the Kings return.

The kaleidoscope of resistance movements spanned the entire political spectrum. As was the tradition in Greek politics, most of the movements identified with charismatic individuals ("personality politics"), and others were simply regional. There were far too many to cover adequately in this chapter and it is not necessary to do so. Suffice to say only that they were numerous, and existed for every possible political, or social reason. The Greeks who joined these various movements did so for an equally numerous myriad of reasons. There were however, a few common threads. By 1940, most Greeks no longer supported the Monarchy. It was an unnecessary burden to most, and the idea of a divinely supported dynasty "ruling" over Greeks was in contradiction to the Greek character and spirit.

Ambassador MacVeagh predicted that the Monarchy would never be accepted again in Greece, no matter what the outcome of the war. Expressing the opinion of most Greeks, and referring to the Metaxas dictatorship, he wrote, "...it is almost certain to be remembered that the King's only answer to Greece's political problems in the past was to install and support a dictator, and that after the dictators death...a Government, and a High Command, representing nothing more national than the rump of a

fascist junta."<sup>12</sup>

A second thread of commonality was that most Greeks felt a resentment towards undue outside interference in the affairs of Greece. Their growing distaste for British meddling pushed more than a few Greeks toward the political left. MacVeagh highlighted this when he wrote that "years of British dominance has caused Britain's reputation with the people at large to be severely compromised."<sup>13</sup> The Greeks, as well as the Americans, blamed Britain for tolerating the Metaxas dictatorship, and propping up the Monarchy. And finally, there was the common hatred for the German conquerors and collaborators, whose brutal policies encouraged many "would be fence sitters" to join the resistance.

As the British were shifting their support from EAM to EDES in late 1943, American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) agents were arriving in Greece to fight with the resistance. They provided some of the first impressions of the Greek situation. Their general attitude was one of hostility to their British counterparts and sympathy for the EAM/ELAS partisans. One British commander even accused the OSS agents of "crusading for EAM/ELAS against the British," and complained that the Americans would become "an innocent channel for Communist propaganda." Many of the OSS agents were Greek-Americans, and in fact did have a real affinity for their Greek partners, but more than being of leftist leanings, was the fact that they disliked the British and their overbearing, neo-colonialist policies in Greece. One OSS operative, George Vournas, declared that the British "were not

interested in Greek liberation or even effective prosecution of the war, but in naked imperial interest..."<sup>14</sup> The OSS accounts are important in that, while not official policy, they were very indicative of the American perception of the Greek resistance movement, and even more telling, the American attitude toward the British.

When it came to the resistance, the Greek had two choices available: the Left (communist), or the Right (which was actually left center). Depending on the circumstances, many Greeks never got to make a choice. For instance, because EAM/ELAS was so dominant in many regions, for a Greek to join the resistance meant that he joined EAM/ELAS. In fewer cases, the same was true of those regions dominated by the Right. Until 1943 when other organizations began to gain strength however, EAM/ELAS was the resistance.<sup>15</sup> In total, approximately 72% of the Greeks who actively fought in the resistance were associated with EAM/ELAS.<sup>16</sup> "The energy and enthusiasm mobilized by EAM was tremendous, and most of its members were inspired by honest and lofty motives and most profoundly believed in the righteousness of their cause."<sup>17</sup> Being "first in the field" EAM/ELAS captured the resistance movement during its impressionable stage. Its representation of a new, democratic Greece, free from the Monarchy, free of dictatorship, and free from the bondage of the Germans, gained the respect of the people. Additionally, the Left capitalized on the severe hardships of the people. The complete breakdown of the social order brought all Greeks to an equal

level--rich, poor, and middle class, now all stood in bread lines and lived in fear.<sup>18</sup> The appeal of EAM/ELAS (and thus, KKE) spread, and compounded itself. The more popular EAM/ELAS got, the more men it recruited. The more men, the stronger it was, and the more dominant it became over its rivals. The stronger and more dominant it became, the more aid it received from the British, and the more popular it got. Thus, the cycle repeated itself again and again.

The Greek Civil War can be separated into three distinct phases: phase I spanned the time period between the summer of 1943, and liberation in October, 1944; phase II was the Battle of Athens, from 3 December 1944 to 15 January 1945; and phase III encompassed the years from around February 1946 to the defeat of the communist army in August 1949.<sup>19</sup>

## ROUND ONE

The first phase took place amidst the German occupation, and was characterized by the struggle for power among the many different resistance organizations; more precisely, the struggle for survival of all groups that opposed EAM/ELAS. As Allied fortunes began to improve in World War II, the partisan bands saw liberation in sight. Each was hoping to gain recognition and representation in a postwar government. By Summer 1943 the British Military Mission (BMM) had set up operations in the mountains of Greece, and was desperately attempting to organize

an effective campaign of resistance. This was very difficult to accomplish in light of the very unorganized manner in which the Greeks had structured their own program of resistance. This fact led the British to complain that "much of the energy of the guerrillas was directed not against the Axis forces, but against each other, and that their efforts at coordination seemed largely futile."<sup>20</sup>

One of the first efforts of the BMM was to set up an official Joint Headquarters in July 1943, consisting of the three largest partisan groups: EAM/ELAS, EDES, and EKKA. The signed treaty, known as the "National Bands Agreement," pledged British aid in the form of gold sovereigns, and arms, and delineated the operational areas of each force. Also, there was a unanimous declaration by all political parties and resistance groups, to include the royalist government, that the King not return to Greece until after a plebiscite could be held.<sup>21</sup>

The treaty did little to stop the internal feuding, and five months later fighting broke out again. Throughout Greece, ELAS struck the other resistance forces with success, almost totally exterminating most of its opponents. At end of February 1944, the Allied Military Mission finally succeeded in bringing about an armistice known as the Plaka Agreement.<sup>22</sup> EAM/ELAS used this cease fire to establish an alternative government, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA). At this time, EAM/ELAS controlled approximately four-fifths of the country with a force numbering almost 50,000. Its only major rival, EDES, retained the



last fifth--its home turf of Epirus in northwestern Greece--with a force close to 6000 soldiers. It is necessary to note here that while battling each other, the guerrillas were simultaneously carrying out resistance operations against the German Army. The internal fighting most certainly hampered resistance efforts, but nonetheless, the partisans attained moderate success against their occupiers.<sup>23</sup>

Events during the next several months of 1944 resembled anything but unity. In April and May, Republican and Leftist soldiers led a mutiny in the Greek Army and Navy units stationed in Egypt. The revolt was in protest to the government-in-exile's continued support of the King, and refusal to recognize PEEA. This protest was quickly suppressed by the direct intervention of British troops, but it did prompt the government to attempt another compromise. George Papandreou was sent to Lebanon as president of the conference that became known as the "Lebanon Agreement." On May 24, a new government became official. Papandreou was President, and five ministerial posts were reserved for KKE/EAM/ELAS. Also agreed upon were the conditions for the liberation of Greece, to include the disposition of forces, and their subordination to the British Middle East Command.<sup>24</sup> On 26 September, another big step towards unity was seemingly realized with the signing of the Treaty of Caserta. This document stipulated that all guerrilla forces, and the Greek Regular Army, would fall under the command of the British representative of the Allied Headquarters. The liberation of

Greece would involve all units, whether regular or guerrilla, the Papandreou Government would be the authority, and the King agreed to not return until a plebiscite was held.<sup>25</sup>

The political jockeying, and the supposed sincere attempts at unity by both sides, contrasted with what was actually happening in the field. With liberation imminent, EAM/ELAS was making their last push to rid the country of rivals, or conduct reprisals against collaborators, depending on where one stood. This period was characterized by unmitigated violence and brutality carried out by both sides. One such terrible incident took place at the town of Meligalas on 16 September 1944, where EAM/ELAS forces massacred 1,450 men, women, and children, and fifty Greek Army officers, throwing them into a large well that was afterwards filled in.<sup>26</sup> EAM/ELAS claimed that the newly formed government was allowing the collaborators to go unpunished. They further accused the government of making plans to use some puppet officials, the gendarmerie, and the Security Battalions (a Greek occupation force under the command of German officers), after liberation. This was partly true. The Papandreou Government did retain some Security Battalion forces in the closing days of the occupation, and the first days after liberation. Although it further fanned the flames of distrust, this was done to maintain order, and discourage unjust reprisals against the populace in the absence of an effective National Guard or Regular Army. Although both the Lebanon and Caserta agreements formally defined collaboration, and condemned all

collaborators, the new government was not active in calling for their arrest and punishment. Instead, as the threat from the Left accelerated, there was more and more sympathy and tolerance for those that had merely "accepted" the occupation, and had "assisted in keeping order and helping the country to just survive." This was especially true in the village, and with mid, to lower level politicians. There, life was devoid of the political/social intrigue that characterized Athens. This is not to say that clearcut collaboration was not identified by both sides. It was, and the punishment was usually death, with, or without a trial.

However, as the occupation began to quickly fade from the minds of most Greeks, formerly black and white matters suddenly turned gray. Things were not clearly divided anymore, except in the case of whether one was communist, or anti-communist. The political spectrum was becoming strongly polarized as the center began to disappear, with only the far left, or the far right, emerging as forces. The left was becoming identified as purely communist, and the right, anticommunist, but also, unavoidably pro-Royalist, and pro-British.

## ROUND TWO

Phase II of the Civil War began in October 1944 as the last German soldier was evacuated from Greek soil, and Allied troops entered Athens. The Papandreou Government was installed and

negotiations immediately began in order to disarm all guerrillas and reconstitute a National armed forces, police, and gendarmerie. Although the two sides entered into negotiations, the Government and the British felt that the EAM position was intentionally hardening, and that they were becoming increasingly more obstructive to the peace process. In the extreme, they feared a coup might be attempted by EAM. On the other hand, EAM/ELAS greatly resented the fact that their influence in the postwar government and military was dwindling. It was taking a backseat to those that had neither remained in Greece to sacrifice with the people, nor actively fought in the resistance to liberate the country. In addition, wary of the strong British influence and their loyalty to the Monarchy, EAM (and most of the population) was convinced that Britain would eventually try to force the King on the people. Lastly, the growing presence of the British, and the increasing dependence of the Papandreou Government on British forces, did little to spread calm, and encourage compromise.

After a tense month of negotiations, very little was decided. On 1 December the six PEEA members resigned from the Cabinet, and ELAS forces began to march toward Athens. On 3 December EAM called a for a workers strike and demonstration to take place in Athens. The call was answered by Athenians of all ages, creating a mob estimated at more than sixty thousand persons.<sup>27</sup> Unable to control the situation, the police fired into the crowd killing at least seven people, and wounding many

more. The Battle of Athens--round two of the Civil War--had begun. ELAS units struck hard, meeting astounding success. Catching the British and the new Greek Government somewhat ill prepared, they gained substantial ground. On 12 December, nine days into the battle, ELAS clearly had the initiative, and "free Greece" consisted of only a three square kilometer area in the center of the city.<sup>28</sup> As fighting intensified however, the Leftist forces became increasingly engaged by reinforcements of British Regulars who finally pushed the guerrilla army out of Athens.<sup>29</sup> A cease-fire was signed on 15 January 1945.

During the battle, Britain's prime minister, Winston Churchill, personally visited Athens to arrange a cease-fire. Although no immediate cease-fire resulted, the Athens Conference produced several British inspired political changes. Papandreou resigned as prime minister, and the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, was appointed Regent. Damaskinos was the one figure that could be accepted by both sides, having managed to stay clear of the political and military strife that was tearing apart the country. Also, as the religious leader in a country of strong Orthodox Christians, he was quite popular. In turn, Damaskinos appointed General Plastiras as the new prime minister. Recently returned from exile, Plastiras had been a career officer who was banned after leading the revolt that deposed the King in 1922.<sup>30</sup>

It was this new government that presided over the signing of the truce on 12 February 1945, known as the Varkiza Agreement. The terms of the truce included the complete demobilization and

disarming of ELAS, and the release of all prisoners and hostages. The additional provisions were quite favorable to the defeated party however. It guaranteed the right to free expression, allowed for trade unions, dictated the lifting of martial law, and offered amnesty for all those who participated in the rebellion. Finally, the agreement proclaimed a plebiscite on the constitution, and parliamentary elections within a year.

It is important to consider at this point why KKE/EAM/ELAS was so hesitant in their decision to assault Athens and overthrow the government. They waited throughout the entire month of November, choosing to negotiate with the British, and the Papandreou Government, before launching their ill-fated attack. This hesitancy allowed the Greek Government to establish itself in Athens with British military support and protection. There can only be a couple of explanations for this delay of action. First, there may have been confusion and disagreement within the leftist ranks on the method of gaining power. Some of the leaders might have opted for the slow process of compromise and political infiltration, rather than a program of overt violence.<sup>31</sup> This seems somewhat unlikely given their past history of political and military violence. The second explanation serves to shed light on the sincerity of the leftist organization as a nationalist movement, dedicated to a democratic solution for Greece. It is possible that the leaders of KKE, PEEA, EAM, and ELAS, all felt that they could work with the Papandreou Government, and that it would be in the best interest

of the country to do so. There is no doubt that "had EAM/ELAS been determined to seize power by violence upon the liberation of Greece, the capital was waiting empty for them to do so on the day the Germans departed."<sup>32</sup> If it had done so, Greek history would certainly have been altered, as well as the initiation of the Cold War and America's role during that period.

With the cessation of hostilities, phase II of the Civil War was history. British reports listed a casualty figure of 2,100, of whom 237 were killed in action. There were other casualties on the government side among the Greek Army forces, and loyalist groups. It is estimated that ELAS may have suffered more than 11,000 dead, and many more wounded. In addition, there were numerous civilian dead and wounded; either as unfortunate innocents trapped in the crossfire, or executed as accused Rightists or Leftists. It is widely held that ELAS took up to 20,000 hostages as they swarmed through Athens. Many of those hostages never returned home.<sup>33</sup>

In many ways, the Battle of Athens was clearly the "high tide" of the Civil War for KKE/EAM/ELAS. In terms of popular support, the leftist movement was riding the crest of a wave. This wave was mainly fueled by extreme anti-Royalist feelings, distrust of Britain and her interventionist ploys, and pride in the role that the resistance organization had played during the occupation. The people were virtually certain that Papandreou and the British intended to force the King back on the throne along with the dictatorship, and this they adamantly refused.<sup>34</sup>

Militarily, the guerrilla army was at its zenith. They were armed with a multitude of weapons, and equipped from German, Italian, and British sources. The army itself (ELAS) numbered over 50,000 fighters.<sup>35</sup> Many of the leaders were former Regular Army officers, skilled in tactics, and knowledgeable in training, equipping, and supplying an army.<sup>36</sup> Morale and support of the ELAS rank and file was also at its high water mark. Up to this point the common Greek partisan was extremely loyal to the cause, and believed that his sacrifice was for a free and democratic Greece. Even as the Athens battle raged, Lincoln MacVeagh wrote President Roosevelt: "There can be no question that thousands of the ELAS and EAM are genuinely convinced that they are fighting for liberty and independence, like their ancestors, and in this they are fanatical."<sup>37</sup> The political force of the movement was also strong. Its most influential leaders were prominent politicians, educators, and intellectuals, who had joined the movement, either for lack of a better choice, or because they fervently believed in the ideology.

EAM/ELAS popularity and strength had peaked however. Following the Battle of Athens, it began to fall apart at a rapid pace. Weapons were handed over, the Army dissolved, and the leaders "detained" in Athens.<sup>38</sup> Many, if not most, of the EAM/ELAS members were more than happy to return to their homes, seeing little reason to continue the fight. The new government had demonstrated its benevolence with the Varkiza terms, and the promise of a plebiscite and general elections. As a whole, the



country was tired of war. Additionally, as rumors of atrocities and mass executions spread, there was a boil over of hatred directed against the left.<sup>39</sup> Communist, and anti-communist became the new defining words of the left-right split.

In March 1946 general elections were held, and as expected, it resulted in a major victory for the right-wing candidates. Although an international team of observers were present, to include the United States, the event was marked by violence, and widespread fraud. Expecting those results, the communists had decided to boycott the election. The following September, the plebiscite was held, and a majority (68.9%) voted for the return of the King.<sup>40</sup> Undoubtedly, the majority was more of a vote against the Left than it was for the King. Nonetheless, the King returned and further insulated himself, not only from the communists, but also the common Greek, as he consolidated the government into a royalist camp once again.

The slide back into Civil War happened gradually. In the closing days of phase II, a small number of extremists (estimated at 3000 fighters) refused to lay down their arms, and made the trek over the mountains into Albania and Yugoslavia.<sup>41</sup> Their aim was to rest, and hopefully refit for another struggle. With no army to speak of, the Greek Government failed to pursue the resisters. That small group formed the core of the Communist army--the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). The KKE, bolstered by the return of its old leader, Nikos Zakhariades, took a more active role than ever before. Zakhariades was the prewar KKE

party chief, and had spent the last five years in a German concentration camp. A pro-Soviet, Stalinist hardliner, he hoped to enlist the support of Russia to continue the war. Zakhariades quickly restructured the party, and filled the leadership gaps in the army. By 12 February 1946, the Greek Communists had fielded a new army, and phase III had begun.

There is one major myth that persists about the Civil War that helped to fuel the superpower confrontation in the opening years of the Cold War. Contrary to many opinions on the matter, it seems to be very clear now that no aid whatsoever was forthcoming from the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup> In October 1944 Winston Churchill went to Moscow to conference with Stalin, and the result was the "percentages agreement." This agreement dictated the spheres of influence both countries would have in the Balkans. Britain was given 90% influence in Greece in exchange for Russia's 90% in Romania, and 75% in Yugoslavia. It seems probable that the Soviet Union felt they could throw away Greece in return for British (and American) silence on Soviet actions in the satellite countries.<sup>43</sup> There is no evidence to show that Stalin ever reneged on this commitment and aided the Greek communist movement.<sup>44</sup>

The prelude to American involvement was very complex, and thus warrants this brief introduction. It would be difficult to cover the transition from Great Britain to the United States, and

the subsequent Truman Doctrine, without the reader having some knowledge of prior events. The situation in Greece in 1945 was chaotic at best. The devastation caused by continuous war, severe economic problems, and the social disaster caused by the influx of more than a million dislocated refugees from Asia Minor, created political turmoil that could not be overcome. On the eve of the Second World War there were still several fundamental constitutional issues left unresolved. Greece was under dictatorship, and no decision had been made in reference to the Monarchy. This, coupled with more war, a brutal enemy occupation, and finally the issue of reconstruction, left Greece prostrate. Thus, the situation in liberated Greece was far more pressing and dangerous than in other liberated West European states.

1. John O. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece 1933-1947* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 8.
2. D. George Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 2, 39-40, 42, 52.
3. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 88.
4. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War: 1944-1949* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 29-31.
5. United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1941, vol.II: Europe* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 725.
6. Ibid., 712, 713.
7. Ibid., 32-42.
8. William Hardy McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1947), 47. General Metaxas died suddenly in January 1941 during the war with Italy. He was replaced by a prominent banker, Alexander Koryzis, who served as Prime Minister until defeat by Germany became certain (three months later), whereupon he committed suicide.
9. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949* (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, 1978), 73-74.
10. Kousoulas, *Revolution and Defeat*, 151.
11. C.M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 72-76; and McNeill, 82.
12. John O. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 376-377.
13. Ibid., 372.
14. R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1972), 126-128. Two such Greek-American OSS operatives, Captain Thomas Karamessines and Major James Kellis, would stay on in Greece and play important roles in the early days of American involvement. Karamessines would later go to work for the CIA and conducted missions off and on in Greece for 20 years. He is credited with creating the Greek national intelligence organization, the equivalent of the CIA.

15. Averoff-Tossizza, 129.
16. American University, Foreign Area Studies Dept., Greece: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 47.
17. McNeill, 90.
18. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, 151.
19. American University, 48-54.
20. Ibid., 47.
21. O'Ballance, 64-65.
22. Ibid., 68-72, and Woodhouse, 164-180. The BMM changed it's designation to Allied Military Mission, or AMM, with the inclusion of American officers in September 1943.
23. O'Ballance, 70-75.
24. Averoff-Tossizza, 98,99.
25. Ibid., 105.
26. Averoff-Tossizza, 106. It is quite ironic that the name "Meligalas" translates to the serenely beautiful meaning: "the village of milk and honey."
27. McNeill, 170.
28. Averoff-Tossizza, 118.
29. O'Ballance, 98-100. At this point in the battle the British were able to mass an overwhelming force that included Tank units, four squadrons of RAF, a Brigade of prestigious "Para's" (from the Airborne Division), the famous "Indian" (Ghurka) Division, and even a division of infantry that was diverted from the Italian Front.
30. O'Ballance, 103, 107. Both Damaskinos and Plastiras were republicans, opposed to the return of the King. Plastiras had served as the figurehead for the EDES movement (led by Colonel Zervas) during the occupation, but because he was exiled in Paris, had played a very inconsequential role in the war years. The King was very reluctant to approve such a team, knowing full well that his return would be that much more difficult. It is documented fact that Churchill himself had to force him to accept.
31. O'Ballance, 108.
32. Woodhouse, 211.

33. Ibid., 108; and American University, 51.
34. Iatrides, 660.
35. O'Ballance, 80, 91, 104, 112, 113.
36. Woodhouse, 59-72.
37. Iatrides, 660.
38. O'Ballance, 113. Not wanting to openly renege on it's commitments in the Varkiza Agreement, the Greek Government formally restored all Regular Army officers to the Army list, but in an inactive status. This included such key individuals as Saraphis, and Bakirdzis. Later, after tensions had diminished, attentions turned elsewhere, and popular opinion had changed, many of the Leftist leaders were exiled to distant islands in the Aegean.
39. American University, 51. EAM/ELAS was not alone in meting out their own form of justice. Rightist vigilante organizations such as "X" also committed atrocities, especially in the period immediately following the Battle of Athens. Spurred on by the almost fanatical anticommunist sentiment that swept the country, the government tolerated these crimes, and in many instances, conducted their own purges.
40. Ibid., 118.
41. Ibid., 113, 115. One such case was the already legendary warrior Aris Velouchiotis who vowed never to surrender. In late June 1945 while moving through a mountain village, he was betrayed, and killed by National Guard troops. In the endeavor to kill the legend with the man, his head was cut off and publicly displayed. Only recently have documents surfaced that link the KKE to his betrayal. One can only surmise that if this is true, the KKE was merely exercising the "self-purge" in order to clean house, as is doctrine in Leninist/Stalinist communism. This fact further supports the claim that not until after the Battle of Athens did the Leftists take on a more international style of communism.
42. O'Ballance, 78.
43. Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947-1949 (New York: Praeger, 1990), 3.
44. McNeill, 145; Vukmanovic, 10.

CHAPTER TWO

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TRANSITION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

As 1945 began, the United States was still mopping-up a two-front war, and involvement in a Mediterranean theater of operations was not even contemplated. With minimal involvement in Greece thus far, the US was content to play only a supporting role there, while accepting the fact that Great Britain was responsible for the region. Much would change in the next two years. The years of 1945 to 1947 were the founding years of American involvement in Greece. Events that took place at that time, and policies that were formulated, set the tone for subsequent US intervention in the Greek Civil War, and eventual total penetration by the United States, thus shaping Greek-American relations for years to come.

On a much larger scale, US policy reaction to the events in Greece would pave the way for the policy of containment. As late as the 1960's, American intervention in Greece was still held up as a shining example of successful foreign policy intervention in a "bipolar" world. The United States had met all objectives set for the Greek aid program: the Greek Communist National Liberation Front was defeated; political stabilization was achieved; there was a return to democratic politics; and rapid economic growth had been stimulated. After hanging in the balance, Greece was finally experiencing reconstruction. Thus, America's intervention in Greece was not only important in the realm of Greek-American relations, but also, and possibly even more important, on the level of US-Soviet relations in regards to the Cold War.



In this chapter I will look at both levels--US-Soviet postwar relations, and Greek-American postwar relations--in order to gain an understanding of the context in which the decision to aid and intervene in Greece took place. On both levels there are separate questions that must be answered, some related to each other, and some unrelated.

In 1945 the United States was very unsure of the evolving "new world order," and was certainly unsure of the role it might play in shaping this new order. Emerging from the War as a leading world power, the US was relatively uncomfortable in that position, and in fact, had not yet convinced itself of the rewards in playing global politics. Many politicians and citizens alike preferred the more traditional isolationist stand. This fact was reflected in the 1946 US Congressional elections where the Republicans took a majority of the seats in both the House and the Senate, and the democratic administration's popularity reached an all time low. As in many of the European countries, drastic changes had occurred on the US political scene. After having just fought a terrible world war, the American people and their Congressional representatives felt a strong desire to turn inward once again, and take care of problems at home. Frustration and resentment with left-over wartime problems, a desire to drastically reduce the budget, and an eagerness to quickly demilitarize, left America with no stomach for any international pursuits.<sup>1</sup>

As the post-war years unfolded however, the United States

became increasingly opposed to what was perceived as Soviet attempts to spread their influence and domination throughout the world. How did US-Soviet relations deteriorate so quickly? What factors influenced the American perception of the Soviet threat, and how was this perception translated into aid and support for Greece? How did the decision of Great Britain to withdraw from Greece act as a catalyst for US action? Specifically, what were the US interests in the small country of Greece in 1945? These questions must be answered in order to understand the importance of American intervention.

At the other end of the funnel lay the country of Greece who by 1945 was on the verge of a catastrophic collapse. Many questions remained to be answered: How would Greece be reconstructed?; Who would govern?; What type of system would prevail there?; and also, What patron country would answer Greece's call for assistance? It was in Greece that America would face a major test of the Cold War. Was the United States prepared to assume the risks and expense of bolstering stability in Greece? Could Soviet expansion be checked by supporting Greece?

This chapter will look at the years of 1945-1947, and will examine US-Soviet relations, the British position in regards to Greece, the transition of power in the Mediterranean (Great Britain to the US), and the issue of the Truman Doctrine. Additionally, I will chart the few early attempts at involvement by the US, and study their affects in helping to spring the Truman Doctrine.

## US-SOVIET RELATIONS

As World War II came to a close, US policy makers finally had the chance to reflect on the relationship with what was quickly being recognized as the other superpower, the Soviet Union. This "strange alliance" had successfully navigated the war years, subordinating radical differences to the greater mission of defeating the Axis powers. A political war had been avoided in order to create a strong front. Nonetheless, the Alliance was clouded by suspicion, and stressed by conflicts of principle and of policy. President Roosevelt's attempts to stem the tide of postwar negative feelings towards Russia were initiated at Yalta in February 1945 with the "Declaration on Liberated Europe." Roosevelt had hoped to approach the Soviets with patience and understanding, bring the USSR into an international organization, and establish cooperation through a tripartite council (with the British).<sup>2</sup> The "Declaration" never matched the importance of the "percentages agreement" that Churchill had concluded with Stalin in October 1944. In a way, the Yalta accords had already been undermined by this Churchill-Stalin agreement which separated Europe into spheres of influence, thus rendering such issues as free elections and self determination obsolete.<sup>3</sup> Hopes and good intentions quickly began to fade however, as tension mounted regarding the separation of Germany, and Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. The US was still willing to compromise, but only on the assurance that no American interests would be

sacrificed.<sup>4</sup>

With the death of Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman assumed the office of President, and although terribly inexperienced, continued the evolving national policy of "patience and firmness."<sup>5</sup> On October 12, 1945 in his first major speech as President, Truman outlined his twelve "fundamental principles of righteousness and justice" which seemingly sent America down the road away from isolationism and neutrality for good. A few months prior, in June of 1945, the US had participated in the establishment of the United Nations charter; thus confirming its desire to play an active role in world affairs and international security.<sup>6</sup> All was not crystal clear however. The US had made several broad, sweeping overtures regarding ideals and principles, but had failed to specifically define its objectives or interests in the foreign policy arena.

By January 1946 Truman's dissatisfaction with the Soviets had grown, and he began hardening his position. The debacle in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the constant criticism from the Republican controlled congress, and the different and constantly changing Soviet interpretation of the Yalta accords caused Truman much anxiety. In a secret letter to Ambassador Byrnes in the USSR the President indicated that his patience was wearing thin: "I do not think we should play compromise any longer....I'm tired of babying the Soviets."<sup>7</sup> East-West relations continued to spiral downhill as tit went for tat, gradually escalating the war of perceptions, words, and interpretations, until there was no

compromise suitable to either side. Then, one month later-- February 9, 1946--Stalin made his infamous speech declaring the incompatibility of Communism and Capitalism. According to Dean Acheson, then the Under Secretary of State, "This was the start of the cold war."<sup>8</sup>

During the critical year of 1946, there were three major events that served to mold American public opinion, and official government policy towards the Soviet Union. First, on March 5, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made his "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. With Truman in the audience, Churchill painted a dark picture of East-West relations, covering the whole period in a "thick fog." Churchill's message was that the Kremlin only respects military strength, and his call went out for an Anglo-American alliance to blunt the drive of Soviet Communism.<sup>9</sup>

At about the same time as Churchill's speech, a little known State Department official at the American Embassy in Moscow was drafting a study regarding the nature and motives of Soviet foreign policy. His predictions and warnings would have a profound effect on the future of State Department policy, eventually pushing the administration to the Truman Doctrine. In February 1946 George F. Kennan was the acting Chief of Embassy in Moscow when he drew up a first-of-its-kind paper that attempted to explain why the Soviets did what they did. Additionally he drafted a set of rules for dealing with the Soviet threat. His telegram to the State Department covered the features of the

Soviet outlook, their official policies, their unofficial policies, and the implications of all this for American policy. Kennan's paper had a sensational effect, and became an unofficial primer for policy makers.<sup>10</sup> Kennan's paper helped bring the big picture a little more in focus, in that it constituted official recognition of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. In short, the report "...became the quasi-official statement of American foreign policy."<sup>11</sup>

Notwithstanding those two above mentioned scares, America was still without a concrete strategy, policy, or set of specific actions to answer the growing Soviet threat well into 1946. Disagreement over Soviet intentions within US policy making bodies was still rampant with no consensus in sight. Was the Kremlin really a bad guy with designs on expansion; or was it only behaving in that fashion as a result of the chaotic postwar period and the internal dynamics characteristic of most totalitarian regimes? Whatever the answer, the secret and ambiguous Soviet agenda beget an equally ambiguous US policy.

By Fall of 1946 American policy makers received the third major impetus to the steeling of US resolve, and, for the first time, recommendations for a more specific application of US foreign policy. In a top secret report to President Truman, Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President on US-Soviet Relations, further summarized Soviet policies. Using Kennan's earlier report as basis, he finally made a list of recommendations for the White House and State Department.

Clifford called for a more methodical, knowledgeable approach to opposing the Soviet threat: "Suspicion is the first step to fear...(it) must be replaced by an accurate knowledge of the motives and methods of the Soviet Government."<sup>12</sup> Clifford's report outlined the Soviet belief in the inevitability of the Communist-Capitalist conflict, their forceful takeover of Eastern Europe, and finally the brewing trouble in the Balkans. In assessing the Balkan problem, he noted: "The Soviet Union is interested in obtaining the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and in the establishment of a "friendly" government there." Clifford went on to say that the US should support and assist all democratic countries which in any way were "menaced or endangered" by the USSR.<sup>13</sup>

America was suddenly waking up to the Soviet challenge. The hierarchy in the State Department were becoming increasingly realistic in their views of Stalin's communist machine, in light of their persistent probing around the globe. During 1945-1946, three crises further served to turn the tide in American attitudes and subsequent policy. In the summer of 1945 there was a Soviet foray into Northern Turkey to put pressure on the Turkish Straits. The USSR, under the guise of "security," was demanding joint control of the Straits from the Black Sea, through Turkey, to the Mediterranean. President Truman's answer to this was to reinforce the US Navy in the Mediterranean, which in turn, reinforced Turkish sovereignty. The Soviet demands ended. The second issue concerned Soviet pressure on Iran. There

the Red Army had refused to withdraw after the War, and Russia was now fomenting revolution through their support of a renegade communist party. The third problem area was Greece, where the Soviets seemed to be encouraging a communist insurrection, and where worsening conditions of misery, starvation, and economic ruin threatened the total collapse of the country.<sup>14</sup>

The US policy makers realized that if the Soviet drive was not blunted, they would gain access, and then control of the strategically important Eastern Mediterranean and Greece, possibly endangering both Europe and the Middle East. Acheson's "negotiation from strength"<sup>15</sup> routine seemed to now echo the President's words: "...Russia's ambitions would not be halted by friendly reminders of promises made. The Russians would press wherever weakness showed--and we would have to meet that pressure wherever it occurred..."<sup>16</sup> By September 1946 US policy was dovetailing nicely and the thoughts of the nation's leaders was best summarized in Clark Clifford's memo:

"Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination...Every opportunity to foment antagonisms among foreign powers is exploited, and the unity and strength of other nations is undermined....The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand....The prospect of defeat is the only sure means of deterring the Soviet Union."<sup>17</sup>



## US-GREECE, A GROWING INTEREST

Until 1945 the American government had little interest in Greece. It saw Greece as a country in the British sphere of influence which should be respected as a matter of diplomacy. Additionally, US policy makers wanted to disassociate the country from what it perceived, and what it feared the world would perceive, as supporting British neo-colonialism, or imperialism, in an area in which it had little interest.<sup>18</sup> Neutrality was still a popular buzzword in reference to Greece. Except for several joint missions to aid Greece, or to merely study the situation there, the government sought to maintain a hands-off policy. Throughout 1945 and early 1946, despite gentle urging from Great Britain to become more involved, there was an insistence on "informal" meetings; "informal" advice; cooperation, but not domination; concern, but not control. Official Washington policy remained "...to abstain from interfering in internal Balkan affairs, and not to take part in any possible military operations, except as regards relief and reconstruction."<sup>19</sup> In a January '46 reply to the US ambassador in Great Britain, Acting Secretary of State Acheson continued in that pursuit. He stated: "US representation on a committee would result in a degree of US participation in internal affairs of a friendly foreign nation far in excess of that to which the US government has heretofore been willing to agree."<sup>20</sup>

Great Britain was not the only one pushing for America to

share in the burden. The American Ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, was also quietly inciting the government to act. Through his negative appraisals of the Greek situation, his gentle recommendations for long term aid and investment in Greece, and his proddings for a more serious vigilance in Greece, MacVeagh sought to help realign America's foreign policy priorities. Even before the "second round" of the Greek Civil War--the Battle of Athens--in the Fall of 1944, MacVeagh had expressed his frustration at his governments lack of interest in Balkan affairs. In several entries in his diary, he wrote:

"We spoke chiefly...of the lack of realization in the United States of the supreme importance of the Balkan area for the question of world peace, a lack of appreciation which makes it equally impossible for me to get the Department to do anything but assent to my Cassandra talk.. ..what is chiefly wanted is greater realization at home of our stake in what goes on in this part of the world....we still tend to think "trouble in the Balkans is something to laugh at."21

MacVeagh became more committed in his belief as time passed, and tried to convey that to his government. In December 1944, and again in July 1945, he made his first suggestions of a tripartite supervisory council to safeguard the "approaching" elections and plebiscite in Greece. It was his feeling that this would be the only way to assure fair play and restore confidence and credibility, both of which were sorely lacking, in British intentions.<sup>22</sup>

From 1945 to the Truman Doctrine period of 1947, MacVeagh

kept up his steady stream of letters, telegrams, and memos, endeavoring to make clear his perception of the situation in Greece, and hopefully prompt the US to act. At the very end of 1945, in an information memo to the Secretary of State, he addressed the Greek situation in terms of President Roosevelt's "four Freedoms." His assessment was that "Fear and Want" were affecting every Greek, and moving the country down the path towards destruction. To this end MacVeagh strongly recommended to the State Department that the United States make clear its intentions to support Greece politically in order to dispel any doubt in the minds of the Greeks, or in the eyes of the world. He also made economic recommendations for special direct loans, investments, and commercial credits, above, and beyond United Nations aid. MacVeagh personally challenged the Secretary of State to push for investment in long term reconstruction, not just for emergency, relief, and war purposes.<sup>23</sup> He left no doubt however, that relief measures be given the number one priority, and that Greece must have assistance in its recovery.

Along with his recommendations, the Ambassador offered a heavy load of gloom and doom in order to get his message across. The Greek situation was serious. MacVeagh saw the problems of economic recovery and political stability tightly interwoven; to the point that corrective measures in one area might produce catastrophic reverberations in the other. While not absolving the Greek Government of its responsibility for the dire state of affairs, MacVeagh tended to see it as a combination of things. He

especially felt that the joint relief efforts were totally mismanaged. "Too many cooks and no chef" was his retort, reference the lack of planning, coordination, and direction of the relief effort.<sup>24</sup> By 1946 there was a myriad of disjointed projects going on in Greece, which had been thrown together in piecemeal fashion, and seemed to be almost counterproductive. There were civilian agencies, military commands, joint committees, and constant changes within the Greek Government, all working with little, or no, coordination between them.

This growing interest in Greece was not the result of purely American desires. Throughout 1945 the British were already pushing for joint Anglo-American involvement in Greece. As early as April 1945, Prime Minister Churchill wrote to Roosevelt suggesting that a joint commission of experts be set up to advise the Greek Government.<sup>25</sup> Then in a memo from the British Embassy to the Department of State in June 1945, Great Britain asked for assistance with the supervision of elections, and the plebescite in Greece.<sup>26</sup> Finally, in November 1945 the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, sent a memo to the Secretary of State reference the sharing of military responsibilities in Greece: "Present conditions in Greece are so alarming that British military authorities in Theater have recommended to London that the US Government be requested to share British responsibilities in Greece."<sup>27</sup> On all accounts, but the supervision of elections, the US was adamantly opposed to any formal organization for fear of becoming too involved.

The Greeks themselves also actively sought the support of the United States. Greek politicians were skillful in exploiting foreign support in order to gain political advantage, and assure continued personal survival and a place in the ruling elite. This had no doubt been developed through years of experience dealing with patron states.<sup>28</sup> Attempts to curry favor from the US came from the political Left, Center, and Right. OSS reports during the resistance phase noted that "The intervention of the United States...was eagerly desired by EAM activists," and this continued to be the case even into 1946.<sup>29</sup> EAM's support for American involvement was a throwback to the late war years when the United States opposed British policy in Greece. Also, the few American OSS agents that actually worked behind the lines with the Greek resistance were known to be anti-British, anti-Monarchist, and even a little "leftist" in their views. Additionally, the Roosevelt administration had openly called for the liberalization of the Greek political system, thus EAM felt that it might have a chance at gaining American favor. In 1945, the recently installed Republican-center government of General Plastiras seemed almost begging for American support. He telegraphed the President: "...the Greek people place their faith in the noble principles of the great American Democracy....and will be able to rely on the full and so precious support of your Excellency and the United States."<sup>30</sup> The Royalists especially felt that they dearly needed the consent of the US in order to survive. Many, if not most of the affluent, and influential Greek

politicians wanted America's involvement, insisting that political and economic order could not be reestablished without such support. To this end, Greek politicians were smart enough to play the communist expansion card, knowing that, if anything, this threat would motivate the US to involve itself in Greek affairs.<sup>31</sup> Finally, Greece, like most of the world in 1945, was in awe of the great power and influence of the United States. America's image was one of honesty and fair play, and the perception was that the US felt responsible to help those less fortunate, while still maintaining a reluctance to tread on the sovereignty of the country in need.

#### **GROWING AMERICAN FRUSTRATION**

The United States was not always amenable to these methods, and in fact, tired of the chaotic Greek political scene, and the politicians, rather quickly. A perfect example of this was the relationship between State Department officials and Constantine Tsaldaris, the Royalist Prime Minister elected in the supervised elections of 1946. The Tsaldaris-type image would go far in coloring the attitudes of many American officials that would later deal with the Greek Government. In January 1946 the United States edged closer to unilateral involvement by approving a \$25 million Export-Import Bank loan to prop up the economic program in Greece. Along with this aid however, came a tough note from the State Department voicing concern about the rampant political

and economic instability. The department wanted it understood that the Greek Government must undertake a program of economic stability, and must do better at forming a more broad-based coalition government. This would remain a constant in subsequent US assessments of Greece. In addition, the message made it plain that "The extent of US loans and aid will be influenced by the effectiveness with which the Greek Government pursues a program of economic stability."<sup>32</sup> The United States had gone from no opinion, to a very forceful one in a short time. Several months later during the Summer of 1946, Tsaldaris met with Secretary Byrnes and Under Secretary Acheson in Paris. Acheson immediately formed a poor opinion of him, and as was so typical of the Under Secretary, commented:

"He was a weak, pleasant, but silly man, obsessed by the idea, of which he talked incessantly, of solving Greek problems by obtaining from the peace conference, ... cession of territory in the north and rivaling Venizelos, who at Versailles obtained Crete for Greece. He also asked us for six billion dollars in economic aid. Mr. Byrnes and I struggled without much success to focus his interest on more possible and essential achievements."<sup>33</sup>

It was after this same meeting that Byrnes too complained that he was "a little fed up with the Greeks."<sup>34</sup> Tsaldaris's ridiculous request seemed to support Ambassador MacVeagh's earlier disparaging remark that "To the Greek mind there is only one answer: foreign financial assistance."<sup>35</sup> Equally as distressing

was the fact that this request had come amid reports that the Greek Government had failed to utilize any of the Export-Import Bank loan made the previous January. To American policy makers, Tsaldaris seemed to represent arrogance and inefficiency, and one who was overly secure (insecure) in traditional patron-client relationships with foreign powers. Tsaldaris would continue to exhibit his brazen behavior, further biasing American opinion on Greece's ability to save itself.

With events in Greece becoming more chaotic and desperate every day, he nevertheless decided to travel to the United States in late 1946. With the "third round" of the Civil War beginning at the same time, Tsaldaris's timing could not have been worse. Travelling against the advice of the State Department, he went hoping to win acceptance of Greece's territorial claims, and no doubt to strengthen his personal position in Greece via his relationship with the US Government.

Tsaldaris met with Under Secretary Acheson. The discussion centered on a "list of Greek demands" that the Greek Prime Minister had prepared for the Secretary of State. After listening for two hours, Acheson became quite irritated:

"When he became eloquent on Greek claims to northern Epirus, I quite lost patience with him and told him what sort of statesmanship it was that frittered away its time and energy on territorial claims, when not only northern Greece but all Greece was headed hell-for-leather toward total destruction."<sup>36</sup>



Years later in recalling the event, Acheson added sarcastically, "Whether it (Acheson's admonishment) stopped him, at least it saved me from the necessity of listening to any more of these dissertations."<sup>37</sup> The Greek Government just didn't seem to get it. The country was in the throes of collapse and it was becoming increasingly evident that they would be unable to save themselves ...or so it seemed to many of the key US officials. Thus was the general consensus at the close of 1946. In an almost prophetic memo one year earlier, Secretary of State Byrnes seemed to sum up what would be the year end attitude of the American leaders toward the Greek situation:

"Department deeply concerned of late at unwillingness or inability of Greek leaders to work together for urgent needs of their country. Impression gaining ground abroad that selfishness and cupidity of Greek public figures are blinding them to all broader issues and that perhaps Greece is incapable of running herself and solving immediate economic problems."<sup>38</sup>

The American perception of the economic and political situation in Greece, combined with the growing distrust of Soviet intentions, would signal a revolution in American foreign policy. This negative perception of the Greek leaders and their behavior, would shape how that "revolution" would be carried out.

## INITIAL AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT AND PERCEPTIONS

Besides OSS participation as part of the Allied Military Mission during the German occupation, and the actions of the American Embassy that served the Greek Government-in-Exile, direct involvement by American personnel prior to the Truman Doctrine began upon the liberation of Greece. During the next two years, there were four different means of involvement: participation on the joint Allied Military Liaison mission (AML/ML); the American Mission For the Observation of Greek Elections (AMFOGE); development of a US Advisory Team; and finally, the culminating Porter Mission. Participation by all of these commissions in political or economic decision making was carefully limited by the US Government. The Government allowed participation for relief and rehabilitation purposes only, endeavoring to remain outside what was still considered to be a British area of operation. Additionally, the US did not want to be seen as falling in line with the imperialist notions of Great Britain. Notwithstanding, these infant attempts at assistance planted the seeds for future intervention.

Agreements for the ML were struck even before Greece was liberated. In the Fall of 1944 a memorandum was drafted "Regarding Questions Concerning Civil Administration, Jurisdiction and Relief Arising out of Operations in Greek Territory of a Military Force." This agreement allowed for US

participation in the military program for the relief and rehabilitation of Greece, but emphasized that no "military operations to expel enemy forces" would be undertaken. The War Department made it clear that the "United States military is not prepared to engage in maintenance of law and order even though such operations should be necessary to make relief distribution possible."<sup>39</sup> At that time the US had no desire to assume what was considered to be British military responsibilities in that area of the world. Furthermore, there was concern among both the State and War Departments that the mere use of the term "Allied," or "combined," might misrepresent what the US role actually was in Greece. In late Fall 1944, the United States wanted to be seen as supporting the quick restoration of Greek sovereignty throughout the country. That same Fall, Brigadier General Percy Sadler, already assigned as the Deputy Commander for Combined Operations with British in the Balkans, was named to head the American portion of the ML. By March 1945, the ML was busy running warehouses, setting up distribution centers for clothing and medicine, and setting up temporary medical centers. Concurrently, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) had begun activities in Greece, along with a heavily British dominated Joint Relief Commission. By 1 April 1945 however, the ML had backed out of operations in Greece, selling, or giving away much of its stock to UNRRA. Many of its workers stayed on to advise and assist UNRRA.<sup>40</sup>

The development of AMFOGE gave the United States another opportunity to involve itself in the affairs of Greece. First mention of an election commission came in December 1944, when Ambassador MacVeagh cabled the State Department suggesting the time was past for the worsening situation "to be cured by any purely Greek initiatives." Thus he suggested an international commission of British, Russian, and American representatives to oversee a plebiscite on the Monarchy, and take care of other "critical problems" that might arise.<sup>41</sup> It is not clear whether MacVeagh was the originator of such an idea, because he states in the same cable that "similar ideas" had passed through the mind of his British counterpart. Additionally, the Yalta accords had already called for free elections in all countries liberated from Nazi conquest, and contained a pledge of support from the three major powers. The tripartite council quickly shrunk by one as the Soviets refused to take part, citing that the team would be an interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is clear that Stalin wanted to insure that the western powers would have no precedent on which to act regarding activities in any of the Eastern Bloc countries. As previously stated, Stalin had already initialled the "percentages agreement" with Churchill, thus he felt that all such Balkan issues had been settled. MacVeagh's cable was quickly backed up by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) who advised "the United States should be prepared to share responsibility in this administration of an impartial plebescite."<sup>42</sup>

By the Summer the State Department was convinced that US participation was absolutely necessary, even to the extent that it happen with or without Greece's approval. Again, concern about the growing inability of the Greek leaders to correct their own problems, the desire of the British to force the King back on the Greek people, the chance of a total collapse in Greece, and the possible impact all of this might have on US security interests worldwide, pushed the US to act. Even in light of the still overriding policy of the US Government to refrain from attempting to influence the Greek Government in 1945, a slight change in attitude can be detected in the American officials that were dealing with the Greek situation. It was the beginning of an attitude shaped by the negative perceptions of the Greek situation, and especially, the Greek leaders. This outlook would have profound impact on later policy, and the execution of such policy in Greece. In July the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt a need to advise President Truman:

"The participation of this Government should not be conditional upon the invitation of the interim governing authorities in Greece, since its obligation in this respect is an undertaking not so much to the interim authorities as to the Greek people themselves."<sup>43</sup>

The attitude exhibited in this memo set the tone for further US actions in Greece. Acheson's rationalization of American involvement--that our obligation was to the people, not the

governing authorities--helped shape similar attitudes once America became deeply involved in Greece.

In October 1945 the President appointed Dr. Henry Grady as Chief of the American Legation to observe the Greek elections. Grady arrived in Greece in December 1945 to meet with all political groups not included in the government. Over the next several months there were several attempts by the Greek Government to postpone the elections, which had been set for March of 1946. At one point the Greek interim Government accused the Allied observers of exerting undue pressure on it to hold the elections in March. This claim was vigorously protested by Loy Kohler, a veteran Foreign Service officer and member of the US team. Kohler insisted that he (and the US mission) had been misrepresented, that they were there at the invitation of the Greek Government, and that the decision was the Greek Government's alone. However, Kohler also added the kicker that the US Government might pull the observer team out of Greece if the elections were postponed.<sup>44</sup> Reacting to this "threat" the Greek Government agreed to hold the elections not later than 31 March 1946. It was a general success, in spite of the boycott of the Communist and Socialist parties. The Right--Royalist party--were the winners, and Tsaldaris was installed as Prime Minister. The election accomplished nothing in the way of compromise and a broad based coalition government however, causing instead both the Left, and the Right to become even more reactionary.

The US Government took a somewhat dim view of the newly

formed Greek Government. Acheson himself was acutely aware of the unrepresentative and repressive nature of the new regime. At one point Acheson even referred to Tsaldaris's claim that the March elections had given the Greek Populist Party a mandate to form a government, as "narrow legalistic argumentation." He went further to even suggest that "certain notoriously reactionary Rightists... should be removed from power for the good of the Greek people as a whole."<sup>45</sup> This was a major concern of the Truman administration on both the domestic and international (UN) fronts. With each, the US was fearful of being seen as supporting a reactionary government that did not have popular support. Nevertheless, the election results were accepted, and AMFOGE II was called back to Greece to observe the plebiscite the next Fall.

A third arm of American involvement developed in the Spring of 1945, growing out of the deactivation of the ML, the limited success of UNRRA, and the critical lack of expertise of the Greek Government in fixing the country's problems. Earlier British efforts at forming a joint advisory commission had been rebuffed by President Roosevelt. Roosevelt did give in to a limited mission in February 1945 however. Greece had requested a combined team of experts to study railroad, road, and port systems, which had been totally destroyed, and the synchronization of land communication with sea and air navigation. On May 23 the Joint Transportation Facilities Mission--Greece (JTFMG) was sent under

the direction of Colonel Douglas Gillete.<sup>46</sup> The JTFMG finished work one year later, But Gillete stayed on as part of the Embassy staff, continuing to "informally" advise the Greek Government, just as previous members of the ML had done. Once Truman took office there was increased eagerness to take on more of an advisory role in Greece. Truman approved of the JTFMG work, and supported other initiatives. Throughout 1945 and early 1946 the State Department drafted several proposals to send technical advisors to Greece, but always in an independent role, once again avoiding collaboration with the British. The one joint mission it agreed to was the Currency Control Committee (CCC), to which former ML member Gardner Patterson was appointed. For various reasons the independent advisors were never sent to Greece.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps the Truman administration was still feeling its way through the muddle of new goals, objectives, and policies required of the postwar world, and did not want to make a wrong move in Greece. There was a good chance that if America pursued too active a role and Greece collapsed, the US Government would be blamed. Consideration given to the advisory role policy did however lead to the development of a more concrete plan in late 1946. The reality of a prostrate Greece, coupled with the almost total "inertia" in the political and economic quarters of the Athens administration, caused President Truman to approve a plan to send an Economic Investigating Commission to Greece.

On December 12, 1946 Truman sent the economic team to Greece



headed by Paul Porter, the former Administrator of the Office of Price Administration. Porter's job was to investigate ways that American assistance could improve Greece's desperate economic situation.<sup>48</sup> By this time the State Department was concerned that more aid money to Greece would prove fruitless because of the incompetency and ineffectiveness of the Greek leadership. Just a few months prior to the decision to send Porter, the Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris had made the ridiculous request for \$6 billion in US economic assistance. Most of the key officials in the State Department, not to mention those in Congress, were becoming increasingly distrustful of the right-wing government in Greece. Furthermore, many of those in Congress did not understand, or did not share, the significance that the administration placed on the events in Greece. The Truman administration's solution to this--a 180 degree turn in policy--was this fact finding mission to identify problem areas and investigate ways that US aid dollars could improve the situation. Also, the Administration hoped that this move might demonstrate the desire for a closer supervision and control of US aid monies. The mission was designed to insure that no more of the aid money would be malutilized. This move was an important breakthrough in US policy towards Greece, in that the mission was totally unilateral.

The first Porter report, dated February 17, 1947, was destined to have a profound effect on American actions in Greece

henceforth. Porter was immediately hit with terrible first impressions of the Greek Government and the chaotic situation. He started the report with "...encountered difficulties and frustrations, usual in Greece, in getting reliable information." It was clear that the Greeks themselves did not have a handle on the situation, nor did they fully grasp the critical danger that they were now in. After laying out how the fiscal problems could be met, Porter followed with, "But the Greek Government has given us little indication thus far that it will take the steps necessary to bring its budget into approximate balance." Porter further cited the failure of the wealthy to bear a proportionate share of the cost of government, the weakness of the Government to withstand demands for wage increases, and the complete inefficacy of private enterprise to invest in development. He commented, "The State has taken no effective steps to create a climate of confidence," in pointing out how it had failed to prohibit the flight of capital. Despite Porter's insistence to the contrary, Greek ministers and industrialists believed that achieving international and domestic security, and affecting economic relief, were two things that could not happen simultaneously. Porter feared that by the time the Greek Government concentrated their efforts on the economic problems, Greece would slide onto the ash heap of history. He was appalled at the inability of the politicians to subordinate their personal desires to the needs of the country, considering Greece was on the brink of disaster:

"..we have a loose hierarchy of individualistic politicians, some worse than others, who are so preoccupied with their own struggle for power that they have no time, even assuming the capacity, to develop economic policy."

He noted the "high degree of corruption," the fact that "The Civil Service is a depressing farce," and the "almost complete deterioration of competence in governmental services." Porter even took his report beyond government and economics, commenting on the "unhealthy psychological condition of the people," their "sense of helplessness," and their "pathetic dependence on the US." At the close of his alarming report, Porter seemed to be warning the Truman administration, even pushing it to get more involved: "It is characteristic of these people not to take corrective measures until absolutely necessary and then to take only a minimum."<sup>49</sup>

If the Porter Mission report wasn't omen enough, there was one other distressing assessment of the Greek situation. Simultaneous with the Porter Mission, the UN Security Council appointed an investigating commission to study the border violations in Greece, and to submit recommendations. This Commission was headed by Mark Etheridge, editor and publisher of the two major Louisville newspapers. His report was equally as damning of the situation, but on an international scale: "The Soviets are finding Greece surprisingly soft. The matter has gone

beyond the probing state and is now an all out offensive for the kill."<sup>50</sup> Regardless of how correct Etheridge may have been in his assessment, and it now appears in retrospect that he was not, his report also had a very strong impact on the US decision to intervene in Greece.<sup>51</sup>

Both the Etheridge and Porter reports were the last significant warnings prior to the Truman Doctrine. Without mitigation they clarified the gravity of the situation. Together, they proved to be the spark that would ignite the flame, which would determine the future of American foreign policy.

In tracing direct American involvement prior to the Truman Doctrine, a pattern can be detected. In all of these examples, especially the early cases, the United States hoped to avoid being identified with the British in Greece. This was because of the UK's imperialist image there, and the perception that Great Britain was determined to make Greece into a neo-colonial outpost. In fact one may conclude that the US refrained from moving too fast towards intervention in order to distance itself from Great Britain's presence there, and the many unfavorable opinions it had regarding the UK's handling of the crisis. In addition, the US Government wanted to steer clear of Soviet and UN accusations regarding foreign intervention. Similar criticism was coming from certain sectors in the US Congress as well. All the American missions endeavored to maintain an informal and independent status, all the while reporting directly back to

Washington, rather than through a joint headquarters.

Additionally, the US relied on several experts that stayed on in Greece once their agency had disbanded, to informally advise Greek Government officials. Despite the official policy to remain unattached and avoid involvement in Greece, the reality was that the US took quite a few opportunities to intervene. Whether this was because of a distrust of British policy there, a growing dissatisfaction with the Greek Government, or the preparation for potential intervention and penetration at a later date, it is not certain. A possible conclusion is that it was a combination of all those reasons. In light of the gathering storm in the international arena, it is probable that the United States was inching towards a specific application of an unspecified major foreign policy decision. As the US continued to wade through the muddy waters, objectives and goals became more and more clear.

#### **GREAT BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL**

The United Kingdom had been involved in the affairs of Greece for over 130 years. Intervention waxed and waned, sometimes even resulting in an informal penetration of sorts. Great Britain had influenced the political balance in Greece on several occasions, thus they were very familiar with "Balkan style" politics. There was also the fact that the Monarchy was propped up by British support. Finally, the British Government had invested a fair sum of money in Greece through the years. If

there was any truth at all to "sphere of influence" foreign policy, the Eastern Mediterranean most certainly belonged to the UK.

In 1945 however, the United Kingdom was besieged by problems. Forced to liquidate many of its overseas investments and incur heavy debts to fight the war, the UK was in serious financial straits. The winter of 1946-1947 was extremely harsh, and Britain suffered through an acute coal fuel shortage, receiving aid from the United States to keep afloat. Additionally there was a strong call to downsize the Army in order to solve domestic manpower problems. Coupled with this was the astounding defeat of Churchill's Conservative Party, and the desire of many of the liberals of the Labor Party to see an era of Socialization spread across Europe. This entailed a more "understanding" approach towards the Soviets.<sup>52</sup> These great domestic economic problems and the swift change in the political climate, for the first time focused attention on the declining power of Great Britain, and the curtailment of its economic and military power abroad. They no longer had the strength to hold their empire together and maintain their worldwide strategic positions against the challenge of the Soviet Union.

In the two years preceding the Truman Doctrine Great Britain demonstrated a growing willingness to share the "Greek burden" with America. As I stated previously, there were several attempts to include the US in joint endeavors in Greece. Additionally, by 1947 the British were frustrated with the Greek situation, and

were wary of the bad press they continued to receive regarding their policies there. Even as early as December 1944, Churchill had a bad taste in his mouth and was "...resentful of American press criticism of his Greek policy and deeply disappointed..." over what he felt to be the American Government's lack of understanding of his attitude and its failure to support him. Churchill felt that America's constant criticism over the UK's supposed colonial policies in Greece, only served to undermine British efforts. That same month Churchill sent a message through Ambassador MacVeagh intended for President Roosevelt:

"Tell him that I hope he can help us in some way. We want nothing from Greece. We don't want her airfields or her harbors--only a fair share of her trade. We don't want her islands. We've got Cyprus anyhow. We came in here by agreement with our Allies to chase the Germans out and then found that we had to fight to keep the people here in Athens from being massacred. Now if we can do that properly--and we will--all we want is to get out of this damned place."<sup>53</sup>

Although the British were far from being the innocents that Churchill's statement suggested, America might have been better forewarned if it had heeded the Prime Minister's words.

By the start of 1947 America was indeed bearing much of the burden in Greece. It was actively pursuing unilateral actions there, and was considering additional aid. The events of February moved swiftly. On February 20th the American Embassy in London reported that the British Treasury opposed giving further aid to

Greece because of the dire economic conditions in Great Britain. One day later, Friday, the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchapel, delivered the famous "blue note" to the State Department. Due to Secretary Marshall's absence, Acheson and Loy Henderson accepted the notes--there were two--which in effect said that British aid to Greece and Turkey would end in six weeks.<sup>54</sup> The British Aide-Memoire went on to ask that "...the US Government will agree to bear, as from the 1st April 1947, the financial burden..."<sup>55</sup> The notes sent the State Department scurrying. By the following Monday, the War, Navy, and State Departments had already prepared reports and decision briefs for the President. The next day rendered a quick decision from the President. Truman hardly needed convincing, later stating that he had essentially drawn a conclusion in the weeks prior as he read the reports and messages from the experts. It is certain that the MacVeagh cables, and the Porter and Etheridge reports had an immeasurable effect on the President's decision. It was cut and dry: "Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean."<sup>56</sup> In a top secret memo to his boss, Acheson seemed to sum up the significance of the critical hour at hand: "...two notes of the most vital importance...the most major decision with which we have been faced since the war."<sup>57</sup>

So, the question that must be asked is was the British withdrawal a cause of the Truman Doctrine, or was it a pretext



for its adoption? Without doubt, it was a major variable in the decision to issue the Doctrine and execute certain interventionist controls in Greece. The timing of the note certainly seemed to take the United States by surprise, and it certainly quickened the pace with which the Truman Doctrine was issued, and plans were executed in Greece. More than anything, it served as a wake-up call for America. Nevertheless, there are some hints from history that lend credence to the idea that the US had already decided to intervene, economically and politically at least. Based on the fact that the Porter Mission had already been dispatched to Greece, and with much greater autonomy than before; the extremely negative reports rendered by MacVeagh, Etheridge and Porter; and the already dim outlook towards the situation in Greece from American policy makers; it is no surprise that President Truman had made a tentative decision prior to the British "blue note." It was not the hasty decision that the events of February 1947 might belie. In retrospect the decision came about through two years of slow, painstaking foreign policy work in new, previously uncharted waters. One might suggest that America was wandering aimlessly during the immediate postwar years. This may be true. As I stated earlier, America was unsure of the "new world order," it was unsure of its role in this new order, and it was certainly unsure of its relationship with, of course, the Soviet Union. Even more important, it was unsure of its relationship with Greece, and the significance that small country might have in shaping the Cold

War. Just as the route becomes more clear (or unclear) the further along one travels, America's goals and objectives solidified and crystallized, making clear the route to the beacon--the Truman Doctrine.

#### **THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE**

"If we are to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where they were already significant threats, withdrawal, "Fortress America" notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them."<sup>58</sup>

Thus was the resoluteness with which the Truman administration attacked the new problem. Overnight the American leaders had solidified their positions, and there was now unanimity in the State Department and amongst the President's advisors. There was a consensus: ideology must be the issue. Not humanitarianism, not idealistic concerns about the Greek people, but rather the battle of Communism versus Democracy as the major theme. American action must be in concert with the pursuit of American interests.<sup>59</sup> Greece just happened to provide the perfect battleground on which to "hold the line."

On 27 February, Truman and his advisors met with the

congressional leaders to sell them on the decision to aid Greece. It would be a hard sell, and Dean Acheson sensed it. Later he was to say of the moment, "These congressmen had no conception of what challenged them; it was my task to bring it home."<sup>60</sup> Bring it home he did. Using the analogy of one rotten apple spoiling the whole barrel, Acheson spoke of Soviet pressure on Greece, a Soviet breakthrough in the Mediterranean, and the subsequent Soviet penetration of three different continents. There could be only one decision: that this Soviet gamble must be thwarted. The security of the US would depend on strengthening Greece and Turkey, and preserving their national independence.<sup>61</sup> Truman was successful in convincing the congressional leaders. The issue was not so much saving Greece, as it was using Greece as a means to attain a goal. It was a turning point in American foreign policy, and the leaders came to realize it. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Leader of the Majority, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and former isolationist, became an invaluable supporter of the new policy and helped to influence congressional action. In a letter to a colleague at that time, he wrote "...the problem of Greece cannot be isolated by itself. On the contrary, it is probably symbolic of the worldwide ideological clash between Eastern Communism and Western Democracy ...which requires us to make some very fateful and far reaching decisions."<sup>62</sup> Eventually, Vandenberg's leadership on this issue forced a major attitude shift in Congress, and turned the tide in support of the doctrine.

Selling the policy to the two houses of congress was even more difficult. Throughout March and April the Greek-Turkish proposal was debated, examined, and criticized. More than just a few of the sins in supporting Greece were exposed, and these issues would later have great impact on the method, and extent, of US intervention and penetration there. The opposition to the proposal was stiff and sought to expose the inadequate Greek Government: "Sympathy for Greece is aimed at its sufferings due to Germany and Italy, what does Russia have to do with it?;" "Greece has created its own problems by not curbing financial policies, and by refusing to reform its tax program."; The Greek Government is controlled by the corrupt, extreme Right, forcing many moderates and dissatisfied Non-Communists to refuse to support the Government."; "The US would be bailing out an outdated and unpopular Monarchy (and inheriting a British problem)."; "The Greek Government has disregarded all advice thus far, and has no intention of heeding the advice of the United States."; "Communism is a bugaboo, but we are being asked to send our money to another sink hole--Greece."; and "With all these problems can aid really be effective without political intervention? And once we do, won't we will be guilty of imperialism?"<sup>63</sup> With doubts about Greece still outstanding, the House and Senate passed the aid proposal on May 22.

Also during this time there was great concern over the universal applications of the Truman Doctrine and its lack of specific language. The fear was that the Doctrine would be a

"blank check" for countries all over the world, as long as they could establish the "existence of a threat of subjugation." The broad, sweeping style of the Doctrine made many in Congress draw comparisons between the Civil War in Greece and that in China. If America's pledge was based on principle, why would the US choose Greece over China, and why shouldn't the US assist both countries? According to George Kennan, who originally opposed the sweeping language of the Doctrine, the State Department position on the matter concerned three points: 1) Was it doable?; 2) If the US takes no action, will it result decidedly in an advantage to our enemies?; and 3) If the US does take action, is there good reason to hope that the favorable consequences will carry far beyond the limits of the country itself?. In the case of China, the US was doubtful that the Communists could hold power over the entire country, and if they did, they would not team with the Soviets. Also, the deterioration of China was not fatal to US interests, nor was the Nationalist Government there a very promising alternative. It was not an industrial power, it was not a military power, and in fact, its collapse was the result of its own corruption and political weakness. This comparison to China was the first critical litmus test to the Truman Doctrine, and proved that it could be specifically applied to serve only what was in the American interest.<sup>64</sup>

It is notable that throughout this critical two week period of the British "blue note" and the development of the US Greek-Turkish proposal, Greece was never consulted. The sovereignty of

Greece was hardly a consideration. It had been clear for quite some time to the President and his advisors that if aid went to Greece, intervention would be a necessary evil. America could ill afford to squander money and resources on an uncontrolled, undependable Greek Government. In order to sell the proposal, Congress had been promised that American aid money would be tightly controlled. Additionally, it was believed that such intervention would help Greece get back on its feet much quicker. On March 3, the State Department realized that there must be some type of request forthcoming from the Greek Government in order to make the whole thing legitimate. So, in a forceful, expedient manner that would later characterize American efforts, the State Department, "with the help" of the Greek Ambassador, drafted the request. Already colored by prior dealings with the Greeks, Acheson described this event in a somewhat sarcastic manner:

All this time Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be saved. The hour had come for the patient to be heard from. On March 3, with the support of kind friends and their guidance of a feeble hand, the Greek Government wrote asking for the help-financial, economic, military, and administrative..."<sup>65</sup>

With a request from the Greek Government in hand, The Truman Doctrine proclaimed, and consent of Congress secured, the United States was prepared to go on the offensive.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. From 1945 to 1947 we see the position of the United States Government swing from one of very limited involvement in Greece, to a full blown pledge to rebuff any forcible overthrow of the Greek Government. This decision was certainly not determined by events in that country alone. Nor was it solely determined by British withdrawal from Greece. Rather both of those factors were catalysts in the gradual swing, and methodical development of American grand strategy in the postwar world. As we saw in this chapter, there was a bigger picture shaped by a combination of factors that guided America to intervene in Greece. First, there was the realization that the Soviet Union was the new enemy: 1) that Soviet intentions toward the US were threatening and unfriendly; 2) that Soviet policy was expansionist; 3) that they would use their agents (communist parties) in foreign countries to attack US interests; 4) and finally, that there must be a strong show of determination and resolve by the United States in order to halt expansion and discourage communists in all countries. There were several distinct actions that influenced this realization. The four most important were Stalin's "Communism-Capitalism incompatibility" speech, Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, Kennan's study, and Clark Clifford's report. The American perception, shaped and molded by these reports and events of 1945-1946, created the US view of a collapsing world order. The belief was that a global crisis was at hand. Action was needed, as was a specific, tangible event and place to apply

American principles, and demonstrate resolve.

On a much smaller scale, events in Greece were proceeding at a quick pace. Throughout 1945 and 1946, the Greek political scene became more partisan, more factionalized, and Government inertia threatened to choke off the whole State. The economic situation was almost beyond repair. Adding to that deplorable situation was the sudden withdrawal of Great Britain from the theater. A tremendous vacuum would be created, only to be filled by the Soviets unless the West acted. The United States had found its cause. The link between the stating of principal, and the application of it, had been realized. The small struggle, actually a civil war, in Greece, took on the complexion of the larger struggle, and thus would have much more far reaching implications as a result. With the emergence of the Greek situation, American policy could be streamlined, specified, and funneled into a narrowly defined set of goals and objectives, but goals and objectives that could nonetheless reflect strategic policy. It was a zero-sum game in Greece: the fall of the Greek Government meant victory for the Soviet Union, therefore a loss for the United States. World freedom was being threatened by communist aggression in Greece.

Thus, the additional question in the introduction regarding US interests in Greece has already been answered. The extremely strategic location of Greece once again provided a convenient place for balance-of-power politics. The collapse of the regime in Athens would lead to Russian control over Greece through a



Communist minority, and the inevitable extension of Soviet domination over Turkey and the Dardenelles. This sudden shift in the Mediterranean balance might have repercussions from the Far East to Europe. With this in mind, the US could no longer overlook the incompetent, and prostrate Greek Government, nor could it count on the United Kingdom to carry even part of the burden. It felt that Soviet expansion could only be checked by assuming the risks and expense of bolstering stability in Greece. In Secretary Marshall's words, the choice was "between acting with energy or losing by default."<sup>66</sup>

1. Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968); and Joseph Marion Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks, February 21-June 5, 1947 (The Marshall Plan)* (Chicago: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1964); and Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1969), 200.
2. Council on Foreign Relations, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947* (New York: Harper, 1947), 5-7; and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ed., *The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, Vol. II: East Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Chelsea House, 1973).
3. See chapter one.
4. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 133.
5. *The United States in World Affairs*, 23.
6. *Ibid.*, 24, 27, 31.
7. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume One: Years of Decision* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), 552. In both Czechoslovakia and Hungary free elections had been held, and non-communist, democratic governments had been voted in, but forced to fold under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Also the newly elected Republican controlled congress was pressuring Truman for being too soft on the Communists.
8. Dean Acheson, *Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1969), 194. Acheson likens the Red Army buildup along Russia's borders in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and their political tactics in international forums (United Nations) as an "offensive" against the US and the West.
9. David S. McClellan, *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1976), 88.
10. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs* (New York: Boston, Little, Brown, 1972), 294, 295. Fearing oversimplification, Kennan delivered his paper in "sermonesque" style, describing the origins of Soviet secret "fronts" and other "stooges" that would seek to wear down the West. Although long, the paper made all the rounds, and even became required reading in some offices, alarming the country to a communist conspiracy. For Kennan, the study "changed my career and life....my reputation was made."
11. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise To Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 97.
12. Schlesinger, 269.

13. Ibid., 301.

14. Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World*, Chapter on "The Truman Doctrine and The Greek Civil War" (New York: World Publishing Co, 1968); Acheson, *Present At The Creation*, 195-198; and Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs By Harry S. Truman, Volume Two: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), 93-98.

15. Acheson, *Present At The Creation*, 196.

16. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume Two*, 96.

17. Gaddis Smith, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Volume XVI: Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1972), 35.

18. Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations With Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), viii. The US respected the "spheres of influence" idea, although later Truman and the State Department did not particularly agree with the theory, and even felt somewhat slighted by Churchill's bilateral "percentages agreement" with Stalin.

19. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 605.

20. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. VII: The Near East and Africa* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office). Acheson's reply was in reference to a British request that the US join the British in the formation of a "currency committee" to help stabilize economic conditions, and the soaring inflation in Greece.

21. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 594, 605.

22. FRUS, 1944, Vol. V, 145; and Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 661-662.

23. FRUS, 1945, vol.VIII: *The Near East and Africa*, 282-289.

24. Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 684.

25. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 205, 206, 208.

26. Ibid., 128.

27. Ibid., 263.

28. Iatrides, *Greece In the 1940's, "Structures of American Penetration,"* 257-258.

29. Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 34.
30. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 101.
31. John O. Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940's: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1981), 276, 296.
32. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 267, 290-292, 299; and FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, 256. The US also announced that it was prepared to make available the assistance of technical economic experts at that time. It should be noted that the first draft of this memo in November 1945 was thought to be too "harsh" by President Truman, thus it was reworded.
33. Acheson, *Present At the Creation*, 199.
34. Wittner, 51.
35. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 284-288.
36. Acheson, *Present At the Creation*, 199.
37. Ibid.
38. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 253.
39. FRUS, 1944, vol. V, 184-187.
40. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 193, 194, 202, 203.
41. FRUS, 1944, vol. V, 145. MacVeagh's cable was sent during the Battle of Athens, causing him to believe that the disagreements between the Left and Right, compounded by British interference, were already "too profound and too firmly sealed by the blood which has now been shed, to be fixed by the Greeks themselves.
42. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 100, 101.
43. Ibid., 131.
44. FRUS, 1945, vol. VIII, 188-193. Kohler cited the continued administrative and financial support of the team as the reason they might have to pull out of Greece. Either way it seems that it was a thinly veiled threat used as leverage on the Greek Government.
45. FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, 237.
46. Ibid., 208.

47. Michael Amen, *American Foreign Policy in Greece, 1944-1949: Economic, Military, and Institutional Aspects* (Frankfurt: European University Papers, 1978), 61-71.

48. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. two, 99; and FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, 278.

49. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 17-22. This is a complete version of the Porter report, and all quotations were taken from this text.

50. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 24.

51. See chapter I for information on Soviet assistance to the guerrillas. Trusting the "percentages agreement" and the "spheres of influence" idea, Stalin had no real desire to assist the Greek Communist movement in overthrowing the Greek Government. This would only be an invitation for allied intervention in Eastern Europe. Stalin threw Greece away in order to protect his "sphere." He was also known to comment that the United States and Great Britain would never standby and allow the Soviet Union to force its way into Greek affairs. Additionally, he knew that the power broker in the Eastern Mediterranean was the country with the most powerful navy. Russia had no navy to speak of. Instead, Stalin was content to work through his satellite countries, waiting patiently in the hopes of reaping the rewards if an eventual Communist victory was realized in Greece. He was always very doubtful of this ever happening.

52. Council on Foreign Relations, *The United States in World Affairs*, 5; and Robert Frazier, *Anglo-American Relations With Greece: The Coming of the Cold War, 1942-1947* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991), 143, 150, 153-154.

53. FRUS, 1944, vol. V, 173. Churchill's message was relayed during a particularly trying time for the British--the Battle of Athens.

54. Acheson, *Present At the Creation*, 217.

55. FRUS, 1947, V, 32-35. The entire text of both notes is contained in these pages.

56. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume Two, 100.

57. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 44-45.

58. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume Two, 102.

59. Joseph Marion Jones, *Fifteen Weeks, February 21--June 5, 1947 (The Marshall Plan)* (Chicago: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1964), 139-140, 151.

60. Acheson, *Present*, 219.

61. Acheson, Present, 218-219.
62. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1952), 340, 343.
63. Foreign Policy Association, Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York: Foreign Policy Assoc., Inc.), 1946-1947, #24, March 28, 1947; Robert H. Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. XV: George C. Marshall (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1966), 89; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, 222.
64. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (New York: Boston, Little, Brown, 1972), 320-322, 373-375.
65. Acheson, Present At the Creation, 221.
66. Robert H. Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State, 79.

CHAPTER THREE

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AMERICAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Just as history has judged the Truman Doctrine as the starting point for the struggle between Communism and Democracy, Greece became its first symbol--the opening round--of that struggle. The United States now had a broad policy statement in the Truman Doctrine, and also a means and objective area in which to apply the Doctrine via the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. It was a policy defined in global terms, but narrowly applied in a limited manner.

The Truman Doctrine struck a delicate balance in the dangerous postwar world. It was a flexible policy that could be used to combat Soviet expansionism and threats to the free world without plunging the US into another World War. The limited use of political and economic assistance, and/or military intervention, were key principles of the Truman Doctrine, and its "measured response" feature was the most effective means of maintaining the balance between opposing Communism and an all-out conflict. The Doctrine was America's pledge to fight communism on all fronts--social, political, economic, and military. The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was proof of its resolve.

The previous chapter covered the disintegration of US-Soviet relations and the worsening situation in Greece, both culminating in the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The view of a collapsing world order brought on by a US-Soviet confrontation, and the possibility of imminent collapse of the Greek state, convinced the United States that the Greek Civil War was worthy of commitment. By the time the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was signed by



President Truman in May 1947, there was no more debate concerning whether to act or not. If democracy was to triumph, Greece must be successfully defended. The administration had not failed in getting that point across. How to succeed, was now the problem. Several questions must be examined in order to gain an understanding of American involvement in Greece. How did the US go about applying the Truman Doctrine to the struggle in Greece? Was direct US intervention in Greek internal affairs necessary in order to insure success? Did aid to Greece require certain political actions of America? Once the large aid package was appropriated, what was the catalyst that prompted US intervention, and how much intervention was enough? Finally, once political intervention was a reality, how did the perceptions of the American officials involved in the "Greek situation" shape further policy throughout the period?

The Truman Doctrine and the subsequent aid program to Greece marked the first time in history the US had chosen to intervene during a period of general peace in the affairs of peoples outside North and South America.<sup>1</sup> It was indeed a turning point for the United States. There would be no turning back, and this period would profoundly change United States foreign relations for the future. Specifically, it would also effect Greek-American relations in a lasting way.

## BACKGROUND

The initial study for involvement in Greece was a staff study that the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) prepared. The SWNCC staff study was ordered on February 24, 1947 the same day Secretary Marshall officially received the British notes. The study recommended: long range rehabilitation (to avoid military involvement), involvement of American advisors and technicians, and a public information campaign to counter Soviet charges of intervention.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile in Greece, a significant change in government took place, setting the stage for the acceptance of American aid. In January of 1947 Tsaldaris resigned under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, in a move that was designed to bring together a more moderate and collaborative government. The US, possibly with the expectation of greater involvement, had already begun to exert increased influence in Greece. This change was prophetic of the instability that was to become commonplace over the next two years. Dimitrios Maximos became the Premier, with Tsaldaris relegated to Vice Premier and Foreign Affairs Secretary. Themistocles Sophoulis, a liberal, became the leader of the opposition in the parliament. Although very partisan and disagreeable in their politics, all welcomed the prospect of American aid.<sup>3</sup>

Contrary to much of what has been written of the post Doctrine history, America was relatively unsure of how it was

going to prosecute its plans in Greece. US policy makers debated just how deep America should intervene in Greek internal affairs. To be sure, the US had to protect itself from Soviet charges of interference and imperialism, which meant that it had to remain outside internal politics. At the same time, American experience thus far in Greece, had convinced the US that the aid program could not, and would not, be effectively managed if American officials were not directly involved. Fearful that an aid package would be exploited by the Greek politicians, Acheson saw reason to emphasize that aid would not be "for benefit of the particular Greek Govt. which happens to be in power."<sup>4</sup> As of 6 March 1947 it was estimated that the United States had contributed \$900 million to Greece.<sup>5</sup> Realizing the condition that Greece was in after spending that large sum of money, Acheson was intent on insuring that any further aid would not be squandered.

#### **GREEK-TURKISH AID BILL**

Following Truman's March 12 address to a joint session of congress, the legislative process began for the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. These bills allowed for aid to Greece through June 30, 1948 at which time Greece was expected to stand on its own feet.<sup>6</sup> It also called for an American mission to control the program. This mission would be highly centralized under the control of one individual, in order to insure that the funds were effectively and efficiently used.

Upon the President's signing of the aid bill the State Department drafted both the acceptance of the aid offer, and the agreement, for the Greek Government. The text of the note left no room for any misunderstanding by the Greek Government, and basically forced it to accept full American involvement in reconstruction of the country. Even before apprising the Greek Government of "their" acceptance, the draft was submitted to President Truman and approved by him. The text left the "primary responsibility for the economic welfare of the country" to the Greek Government, and specifically stated how it would accomplish that end. Finally, both the "request" for US aid, and the agreement, included instructions on the involvement of the US mission.

"The Greek Government wishes to ... renew its request to the US Government for American Personnel who can assist in the Greek recovery effort, including a special American Mission to administer the extension of American aid, observe its use by the Greek Government, and advise the Greek Government...the mission should participate in the development of revenue and expenditure policies, approve Government expenditures...take part in the planning of the import program, approve the use of foreign exchange...assist in execution of reconstruction projects, improvement of public administration, technical training of civil servants and other personnel, ... programming and disposition of Government purchased supplies, and regulation of wages and prices. In general the Greek Government will wish to consult with the Mission before taking any economic steps which might effect the success of the American aid program."<sup>7</sup>

The unprecedented "request" then went one step further calling for the employment of "American experts to act in technical and executive capacities within the Greek government." It arranged for the maximum allowable control by US authorities without those authorities overtly running the government.

Prior to this time it was evident that the US was caught between a rock and a hard place. Greece needed to establish a more representative government in order to relieve the political factionalism that was tearing the country apart. A more cohesive, moderate government backed by popular support could then work together to ease the economic burdens. Greece was split between the the hard right represented by Tsaldaris and the Monarchy, the center under the more liberal Sophoulis, and the far left represented by KKE and its bandit army. With the Rightists fighting to cling to power, the government had grown more and more reactionary, illiciting criticism not only from the Soviets at the UN, but also from many congressmen right here at home. If a cohesive government could be formed, additional foreign aid might be secured, eventually leading to full economic recovery. But how was the United States to accomplish this, or even influence it, without falling prey to interventionist tendencies and forcing its will upon the Greek people? This ran counter to everything America stood for. The principle of self-determination had been--at least ideologically--a cornerstone to US foreign policy. Another great concern of both those in the administration and the American public, was that the assistance program might

lead to full military involvement, and even escalation to war. That was something that no one wanted.

Events moved swiftly however. If the United States had any prior reservations as to involving itself in internal Greek affairs, they were slowly fading away now. With the collapse of the Greek state imminent; the alarming reports from Ambassador MacVeagh, Ambassador Porter, and Mark Etheridge; and the extremely negative perceptions of the Greek Government by such influential US policy makers as Dean Acheson; the United States abandoned its moral high ground regarding non-intervention in one quick thrust. There would be no more discussion. America plunged head first into the penetration stage. Uncharacteristic of his personality, Secretary Marshall even counseled the Greek Government against changing any of the wording in the Aid agreement, stating that "substantive changes...would raise serious difficulties, and that the note should be presented "substantially as suggested."<sup>8</sup>

At this point it seems that the State Department itself was now playing on the traditional Greek political practice of exploiting the patron state for gain. Abhorring this practice before, the Department was now relying on it, knowing that the Greek politicians had no choice but to accept all the conditions of the agreement in order to maintain their status. Maintaining Greek sovereignty was hopefully no longer a question. No Greek official would dare risk censure by the American Government, and thus his political survival, by opposing any point of the aid

package, nor by raising a stink over how it was drawn up.

The decision to send immediate economic aid and an economic mission was fairly easy. This was something that was suggested in the British "blue note," was requested by the Greek Government, and was something that the United States had already undertaken. Aid money was already forthcoming besides the Export-Import Bank loan, and the Porter Economic team was currently in Greece.<sup>9</sup> Although many different options were studied in the days following the British Aide-Memoire and the Truman Doctrine, it was fairly obvious as to what must be done. The critical topic rather, was exactly how to go about assisting Greece.

In a March 4 telegram to the Secretary of State, Ambassador MacVeagh recommended that "Provisions for supervision by American experts of relief reconstruction and development should be broad and inclusive."<sup>10</sup> He went on to specifically advise that experts be sent for civil service reorganization, and port, highway, water power, and reclamation development. Macveagh also took the opportunity to express that "care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the US aim at financing Greek "civil war" or maintaining in power an essentially reactionary government incapable of developing sound economic program on democratic principles."<sup>11</sup> MacVeagh's view seemed to reflect a desire for the US to remain outside direct intervention in the affairs of Greece. He still hoped to encourage the Greek Government to form a "broader democratic government" and to take greater responsibility in political, social, and economic areas, but he

did not feel that it was the position of the US to mandate this. MacVeagh wanted the United States Government to walk the fine line between giving full assistance, but not directly intervening in Greece's internal affairs, and violating its sovereignty. This was so despite his own pessimistic views on the ability of the Greek Government to reform itself and save Greece. This position would later cost MacVeagh his job.

In March, the State, War, and Navy Departments held secret meetings to work out the aid package with the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees. Several Senators exhibited a great deal of hesitancy at these meetings, questioning Dean Acheson as to the necessity of such an aid package. Senator Taft of Ohio complained of the US policy of "dividing the world into zones of political influence, Communist and anti-Communist," and of possible "war with Russia." Senator Byrd of Virginia wanted to know why the United Nations could not handle the Greek crisis; and several other Senators, Claude Pepper included, criticized the Doctrine as "warlike and provocative."<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, the Greek-Turkish aid program, bills H.R. 2616 and S.938, were introduced to the Congress in the last week of March 1947. In those bills, the United States made sure it retained the right to intervene as it saw fit in order to effect disposition of the aid money. From the start the US set conditions that had to be met by the Greek Government, stipulating that there would be "withdrawal or termination of assistance ... for failure to observe these conditions." It was clearly stated in the document that Greece



would :

- "a.) Permit free access of United States Government officials for the purpose of determining whether there is effective utilization of assistance in accordance with the undertakings of the Government;
- b.) Permit press and radio representatives to observe and report freely;
- c.) not dispose, without authorization, of assistance received from the United States;"<sup>13</sup>

With the adoption of this bill in Congress, the United States embarked on a campaign of intervention in Greece. It is noteworthy that there is little mention in the government documents of that time period related to the strict US measures set forth in the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. It might be that most of those involved in the Greek situation were convinced that respect for Greek sovereignty was not in the best interest of the United States. Many cabinet officials and congressmen were still "skittish" on the whole idea of aid to Greece, because of that country's inability to skillfully manage such aid, the financial burden that would be placed squarely on American shoulders, and the international implications mentioned above. Therefore, they were not opposed to direct intervention as a means to secure proper disposition of the money, and better management of the entire aid campaign. In fact, some congressman suggested even tighter restrictions on the aid going to Greece, demanding very specific conditions on how, or how not, to use the aid money.<sup>14</sup>

The poor image of the Greek Government--its incompetence and instability highlighted by the Porter report, and the Ambassador--at this time prompted these initial interventionist procedures.

Further clarification of the aid package came as the result of recommendations by Paul Porter who was still working in Greece. In an important American Economic Mission Report, he was quite overt in recommending that American technicians be employed by the Greek Government and placed in key posts to "participate in day-to-day operations." He further advised that these members be given the "power to stop or curtail aid," and that the mission should supervise "all government finance and participate in the development of fiscal policies."<sup>15</sup> Given Porter's prior perceptions of the Greek situation and the Greek leaders, this memo came as no surprise.

In that same report, Porter recommended that the Economic Mission be the "sole United States authority in Greece to supervise all American aid programs," and that the mission be "autonomous and separate from the Embassy."<sup>16</sup> This last recommendation would soon become the vehicle for total American penetration in Greece, and would lead to American control over the political, economic, and military institutions in the country. As time went on, the creation of this autonomous mission with powers that rivaled the Embassy, would result in an internal conflict that threatened to sabotage the aid package.

It is important to note that the initial Porter report was much harsher in its assessment of the Greek Government, and more

direct in its stringent recommendations regarding the actions of the American Mission. Porter's initial report was no doubt softened so as not to offend the Greek leaders at this time. In many places, the word "would" was replaced by "should" in the final report. At one point in the draft version Porter stressed that "complete control of the funds extended by the United States to Greece should be vested in the Mission."<sup>17</sup> This too was considerably toned down once the final version of the report went into print. Regardless, there was no mistaking the intent of the Administration regarding the level of control it desired. This intent would later be translated, quite overtly, into a high level of control over all Greek Government actions.

From the outset of the American aid plan the US Government made it clear that it had at its disposal the power of the purse strings, and that it would not hesitate to wield this instrument of coercion if the Greek Government failed to apply the measures recommended to it.

#### **AMAG DIRECTIVES**

On June 5, 1947 the White House announced the appointment of Dwight Griswold as Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). Griswold, a former Governor of Nebraska, was very influential in Republican circles. Thus, his appointment helped to sooth some of the fears in the Republican dominated Congress.<sup>18</sup> Prior to departing for Greece, Griswold requested a

meeting with the top-ranking officials of the Government. During this meeting he asked several pointed questions, the most important of which concerned the possibility of reorganizing the Greek Government, and his relationship with Ambassador MacVeagh and the jurisdiction of each. Griswold stated that he "might be inclined to be more firm in his attitude toward the Greek Government than the Ambassador," and that he had been led to believe that his "immediate task should be to change or reorganize the Greek Government." Griswold quickly got what he wanted--in effect, a green light--from Loy Henderson of the State Department. Henderson told Griswold that "certain changes might be necessary" and that the American Mission would probably "encounter obstructions or a lack of cooperation from certain officials, who would have to be eliminated." Attempting to immediately soften this approach, Henderson ordered, "proceed discreetly, in order to avoid resentment on the part of other officials as well as the Greek people." He further cautioned Griswold about being too bold with the Greeks telling him to effect the changes so "the Greeks would feel they themselves had brought about the changes." Regarding his relationship with MacVeagh, Griswold was simply told that he should work closely with the Ambassador, collaborating and coordinating on every decision. Finally it was suggested to MacVeagh that he should meet with the editors of the major American newspapers covering Greece, in order to effect positive representation of US actions there. The last thing Griswold and AMAG needed, was bad press

coverage. In Secretary Marshall's words, "our record should be designed to avoid charges of imperialism."<sup>19</sup>

At that meeting the State Department officials, as well as the other high officials of the Government, passed on to Griswold the quasi official condescending attitude and negative perceptions of the Greek Government. With confirmation coming from the highest levels of the US Government, Griswold was no doubt empowered. At the same time, Griswold was told to make sure he covered his tracks in order to keep any interventionist moves hidden from the outside world. Basically, an order to "do what you have to do, just make sure it looks good."

Just a few short days after the informal meeting, Secretary Marshall drafted a top secret directive to Griswold that contained further guidance for AMAG's conduct. Whether the written directive was standard operating procedure or not, the Secretary obviously felt a need to clarify and strengthen the State Department position on policy in Greece. Contained in the July 11 note were American political objectives: US desires for a broad based government, both economic and political reform, and caution in dealing with the Greek Government. Marshall was very concerned about a certain intransigent, Rightist element in the Greek Government whose conduct threatened to jeopardize the aid plan. This group was best represented by Napoleon Zervas, the Minister of Public Order and former resistance leader of EDES, whose overzealous anti-communist efforts were causing more would be fence-sitters to join the communist ranks, than the other way

around. In passing guidance on intervention, Marshall used phrases such as: "...it may be feasible for us to bring about the elimination of objectionable elements from Greek public life," "...the effectiveness of your Mission would be enhanced if a reorganization of the Greek Government could be effected," and even the more clear and concise, "You will find it necessary to effect the removal of these officials."<sup>20</sup> The extremists on the right were an international embarrassment to the American Government, as well as an obstacle to peace in Greece. Marshall seemed to be giving Griswold great license, even blanket permission, to take charge of the Greek Government and effect any change he thought necessary. At the same time the directive was interspersed with calls for "tact and discretion," and avoiding the "resentment and suspicion of the people of Greece." Marshall's intent was that the removal of officials be "effected quietly and in a manner which will create a minimum amount of resentment," by exercising "great care," so as not to "offend Greek susceptibilities." As the Secretary of State put it, this was to be reorganization through "discreet suggestion."<sup>21</sup>

Looking at the directive now, it seems confusing and even contradictory. On one hand the Department told Griswold that it may be necessary to do whatever it takes to replace a country's Premier, and on the other, to do it discreetly without notice. It was a tall order for even the most solid and experienced of diplomats--and Griswold was not. Additionally, dealing with the Greek situation under these guidelines would require a large dose

of knowledge and understanding of the Greek political animal, and the environment in which he acted. Again, Griswold had neither. He admitted this fact several times in the early stages of AMAG, deferring often to the American Ambassador.

Lastly, Marshall committed the unpardonable sin of violating the rule of unity of command. He failed to explicitly delineate the duties and responsibilities of Griswold in relation to the Ambassador, thus Griswold never really knew his boundaries. It was unclear as to who was really in charge--who would have the final say on all policy matters. Marshall instructed only that the two "should work in close collaboration." This would later cause trouble in Greece. The very nature of Griswold's duties and responsibilities in Greece would inevitably cause them to bump up against those of MacVeagh. It was impossible to completely separate the two offices, thus the risk of a collision brought on by two policies moving in the same direction on different, but interweaving paths was great. In another set of directives Marshall admitted this fact, saying:

"It is not believed possible to draw up in advance a formal definition of the respective responsibilities and spheres of action of the Ambassador and yourself; it is expected that you and he will establish a close, mutually satisfactory relationship, keeping in mind that the common objective of both is the furtherance of the policies laid down by the President and the Secretary of State."<sup>22</sup>

## AMAG IN GREECE

Soon after Griswold arrived in Greece, he made known his modus operandi by using the aid package in a carrot and stick routine. In the initial months of AMAG, Griswold and MacVeagh both expended much effort in endeavoring to change the Greek Government. The entire Summer of 1947 was spent in meetings between MacVeagh, Griswold, Sophoulis, and Tsaldaris in an attempt to broaden the government and end the partisan politics that so plagued Greece. At times, American efforts were overt, forceful, even ostentatious, and were not carried out with a discretion and a humbleness first suggested to Griswold by the State Department leaders. This was Griswold's personality, and it was the way he conducted business -- up front, forceful, and unaffected by wrong perceptions. Griswold certainly wasn't being discouraged however. His methods were even applauded. At one point, in late August 1947, Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett sent a memo to the Embassy stating that:

"Department appreciates vigor and pertinacity with which you are attempting to convince Greek political leaders of course of action which, in our opinion, offers only possibility that your continued efforts will be successful in convincing Greek leaders of the urgent necessity to reach unity."<sup>23</sup>

Lovett voiced the toughening attitude of the State Department towards the Greek situation. He also exhibited the general



dissatisfaction of the Department, and the feeling that the Greek nation would not survive without American intervention. In the same cable to the Embassy he added that "prolonged bickering and disunity...is open invitation to propaganda from North to effect that nation incapable of uniting to preserve independence [and] does not deserve to remain sovereign."<sup>24</sup> Clearly, the United States was intent on effecting change in Greece and insuring success of the program whether it infringed on the sovereign rights of Greece or not. By the Fall of 1947, this belief was fairly widespread and accepted. American officials would push the Greek leaders along, when they strayed off course from US objectives, AMAG would be there to pull them back into line, and when they failed through inaction, American officials would make the decision for them.

Shortly after the time Griswold began AMAG operations in Greece, US policy had already begun to reflect a turn away from insistence on a broad based coalition government for the Greeks. By the late Summer of 1947 most policy makers had given up trying to influence such a move, and in fact, started to believe that such a government would not be in the best interest of the United States. The inertia caused by constantly warring factions in this type of coalition, coupled with the deteriorating struggle against the communist forces, forced the Administration to support some type of organization that could act with greater impunity and in a speedier fashion. On July 21 MacVeagh suggested that, "...we cannot, in view of inveterate pettiness of Greek

politicians, insist too much on advisability of maximum broadening of government at this critical time..."<sup>25</sup> Frustrated by distrustful, unscrupulous Greek politicians, American officials knew that "any coalition government formed could make no decisions without protracted discussion and security leaks, resulting in delay and inaction when vigorous rapid action [was] required in [the] present emergency."<sup>26</sup> The slow-motion action of the Greek leaders was also causing much of the aid money to be frittered away on such things as piecemeal assistance to the Greek Army, which was lacking objectives and a strategy to deal with the communist bandits. MacVeagh wanted to believe that the Greek leadership could rise to the occasion, but even he became more and more hopeless. First ruling out the broad coalition idea in favor of a narrow two party coalition, the Ambassador finally came to the conclusion that, in light of the intransigence of the particular leaders involved, even that wouldn't be successful. To this end he commented, "Fear politicians fundamentally convinced Greece will be saved by US assistance or not at all, hence continued personal and party jockeying to ride in on our tail."<sup>27</sup>

At this time there were several issues in Greece that were affecting the aid package and contributing to the Greek Government's instability. Of major concern was the increase in right-wing attacks on the population, and a general failure in the amnesty program that had been designed to improve the image

of the Greek Government. Also, there was the Government's insistence on increasing the size of the army and police force, and their adamant belief that they must reestablish law and order as a basis for any future reconstruction plan. This was a recurring problem that had hampered American economic efforts before, and continued to infuriate the AMAG planners. On both issues, the Greek Government was able to successfully withstand American pressures to change, thus bucking the incredible control America wielded through AMAG. In fact, the Greek Government eventually turned the opinions of the American officials, receiving their support in the end.

Throughout 1947 the United States had been encouraging the Greek Government to embark on a campaign of granting amnesty to the leftist rebels, hoping that most would lay down their weapons and a full scale civil war could be averted. In the aftermath of the "second round" of the Civil War, the Greek Government had rounded up thousands of communists and alleged sympathizers, executing many, and sending the rest to exile on deserted Aegean islands. This was one area in which the Rightist government acted with determination and swiftness. Many were arrested on dubious charges, and Greek justice was quick and harsh. To exacerbate the situation, roving right-wing gangs conducted vigilante style reprisals on their own accord, with little interference from Government forces or police.<sup>28</sup> The State Department was especially concerned about this problem because US policy in Greece was coming under severe scrutiny, and even criticism for

supporting a reactionary regime there. The Greek Government was doing little to clear up its image. This prompted Acheson to notify MacVeagh that the "Greek Govt should be made fully aware of extremely unfavorable publicity it is receiving on this question...general public opinion in US believes Greek Govt is committed to policy [of] intransigent annihilation of all opposition."

Greek actions and US support came under fire in the international arena as well. The UN investigating commission and the Security Council were about to get involved in Greek affairs if a solution to the problem was not forthcoming. UN involvement and a negative world opinion would spell disaster for the US mission in Greece. The State Department quickly cabled MacVeagh to push the Greek Government to come up with a solution to the amnesty problem. The objective was to clear up the Greek record, forestall a UN Security Council action in Greece, and blunt further Security Council criticism of the Greek Government.<sup>29</sup> Not only did the Greek Government balk at the advice, Tsaldaris took the opportunity to complain of foreign intervention in Greek affairs, and that the US was trying to "tie their hands." He claimed that amnesty would only encourage the rebels, and undermine the morale of the Greek army. To this charge MacVeagh replied to the State Department, "childish and petulant inaccuracies...are unfortunately very characteristic of Tsaldaris."<sup>30</sup> The Greek Government failed to ever fully

incorporate a full fledged amnesty plan, which repeatedly embarrassed the US Government and caused much consternation.

Equally as frustrating was the Greek Government's plans on diverting aid funds to strengthen the military and gendarmerie. It insisted on a larger, better equipped, and higher paid army and police force. Initially, AMAG was opposed to the increased funding of military related activities, fearing more, a general economic collapse, and the breakdown of the political and social structure. Additionally, the State Department was concerned that to subscribe to the Greek Government's proposals would lend credibility to the false belief that "reactionary elements of the Greek Govt are entrenching themselves with US approval and financial support." By the Fall of 1947 however, the Greek Government had convinced AMAG officials that real economic development could not progress until there was real internal security in the country. As a result, military funding increased each year until the end of the war.<sup>31</sup>

By September of 1947 AMAG had established itself in Greece, and the last group of advisors were arriving to join the Mission. At the same time, the Greek situation had taken a serious turn for the worse. The communist guerrillas had increased their activity, making several successful raids in northern Greece, and they appeared to be well trained and well supplied. Within the Greek Government, there seemed to be little change for the better. Another government had fallen the month before, and

Tsaldaris's Populist party was now back in power with Tsaldaris himself as the Premier.

During his short time there, Griswold had already firmly positioned himself, and was becoming more powerful every day. He did not hesitate to get involved in the political intrigue that was played out in Athens, believing that he had full authorization to peddle his influence with the weight of AMAG and American aid money to back him up. Griswold's growing impatience with the Greek situation caused him to push for quick changes, which put him at odds with Ambassador MacVeagh. In a cable to the State Department he expressed "alarm" at MacVeagh's propensity for "gradual" change, and his insistence on not interfering. Griswold firmly believed that the US could not wait for the Greek leaders to solve their problems:

"Time is slipping away and I feel the present opportunity should be firmly grasped. In my judgement we do not need to be affected by a fear that we will be accused of "interfering." That accusation will be made even if we do nothing."<sup>32</sup>

Becoming more bold, he cabled the State Department that "the door is now wide open to get some things done which seemingly are the desire of the United States Government."<sup>33</sup> What he thought needed to be done was to effect a change in the Government by threatening Tsaldaris with AMAG sanctioned restrictions if he did not form a broad government. Griswold made his threat via a

Populist party deputy which drove Tsaldaris into a rage. Additionally, Griswold had failed to tell MacVeagh about his political contact. Tsaldaris then approached the Ambassador in confusion, demanding to know who was in charge.

MacVeagh had not changed his course with the arrival of Griswold, and it now appeared that the two parallel paths of policy in Greece--Griswold's and MacVeagh's--were bumping into one another. MacVeagh had felt all along that the US policy of "careful non-interference in Greek internal affairs to be one of our strongest assets for dealing successfully with the Greek people.." and that the "Department...shall in the long run have greater influence with all if we maintain it."<sup>34</sup> He was not as alarmed by the Greek politicians' apparent lack of leadership and inability to work together as a team. He too had a negative perception of the whole Greek system, but it was tempered by a greater understanding of Greece, and the Greek character. MacVeagh's general outlook on the "SNAFU" condition of the Greek political system was that "...they will settle back to their relatively harmless normal state of political instability..."<sup>35</sup> MacVeagh knew that such a system was not always influenced through grand shifts and sweeping decisions that made the Greek politician move faster than he might want to move. Rather, he believed that more effective change could be gained through soft shoves, strong recommendations, and a slow, methodical process.

Nevertheless, the MacVeagh-Griswold relationship continued to get worse, and by October 1947 bottomed out. Several events

had caused an irreconcilable split between the two "Ambassadors." Griswold had indeed become quite bold, now almost flaunting his power in open defiance of MacVeagh, criticizing his methods, and unilaterally involving himself in business that had heretofore been under the jurisdiction of the Ambassador only. In a monthly AMAG report to the State Department, Griswold flagrantly described how he used the aid package as a "club" on the Greek leaders to convince them to submit to his will in the formation of a new government. Then, the newspapers started to focus on the troubled relationship, and began to paint a picture of a swaggering Griswold, "...Most Powerful Man In Greece."<sup>36</sup> Slightly annoyed by the great license that Griswold seemed to be taking, State Department officials ordered him to clear up the "misrepresentation" of the US role in Greece, and to repair his public image, and that of AMAG.

Griswold responded immediately to the Department's scolding sending back a stinging message: "U.S. need give no thought to avoidance of accusation of interference. That charge against us will be made in any case. Only question is whether good results can be obtained."<sup>37</sup> Later he went even one step further by forcefully declaring that "it would be wrong for AMAG or for the U.S. Government to attempt to represent to world opinion that AMAG does not have great power or that it is not involved in Greek internal affairs."<sup>38</sup> Apparently, Griswold was secure in the correctness of his intentions and did not feel that he had to apologize for his self righteousness, nor any behavior that might



be looked upon as condescending to the Greek Government. He felt unequivocally that intervention came with the turf as the AMAG chief. As the custodian of US Government funds, he felt that it was his responsibility to use AMAG power to attain results: "This means involvement in internal affairs and I see no advantage in pretending it is something else," and that "American public opinion expects forthright action."<sup>39</sup>

The Griswold-MacVeagh feud simmered until late November 1947, when the State Department sent instructions, first subordinating Griswold and AMAG to the Ambassador, and then, under threat of resignation from Griswold, withdrew those instructions and pulled MacVeagh out of Greece. The significance of the Griswold-MacVeagh relationship is that it illustrates just how far the American Government would go to attain desired results in Greece, notwithstanding it might have to resort to interventionist behavior to get there. In reality, it appears that "intervention" in Greek affairs, and respect for Greek sovereignty were not major issues--only rhetoric--when stacked up against action, change, and attaining success in Greece. "Intervention" was the cost of doing business for both America, and the Greek Government.

By January 1948 conditions in Greece had actually gotten worse. No appreciable gains had been made on the political or economic fronts, and furthermore, in the military arena the situation was desperate. The guerrilla army had announced the

creation of the "First Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece," and was apparently receiving aid and refuge from the neighboring Soviet satellite countries. Feeling that they might be on the brink of success, the guerrilla's had launched well coordinated and heavily concentrated attacks throughout northern Greece. On January 6 a top secret National Security Council (NSC) position paper on Greece was released with equally distressing news:

"The Greek Government rests on a weak foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state. There is general fear and a feeling of insecurity among the people, friction among short-sighted political factions, selfishness and corruptions in Government, and a dearth of effective leaders."<sup>40</sup>

Little had changed from the Porter Mission report one year, and several million dollars prior. Added to this bit of dismal news was an indictment of the United States for a weak policy regarding its commitment in Greece:

"..there is difficulty encountered by agencies and representatives of the United States in carrying on day-to-day operations in the absence of a clear-cut policy as to how far the United States is willing to commit itself to the preservation of Greek independence...causing the lowering of morale..and increasing suspicion as to our determination to save Greece."<sup>41</sup>

A following report written in a disparaging manner, described the

Greeks as "...lacking the will to save themselves...", and "having lost all hope for the salvation of Greece," and that "Their frustration and demoralization is heightened by their lack of leadership."<sup>42</sup> In all, 1947 had not been a totally successful year. Greece was not out of the danger zone.

The sum total of all this was that the United States was at another "delicate balance point." A decision had to be made to either continue to aid Greece under the same conditions; to aid Greece, but with a deeper commitment and penetration of various other institutions like the military; or to pull out of the quagmire as soon as possible.

Besides the NSC reports on Greece, the political section of the embassy in Athens, drafted an important study on the situation in Greece. Urging continued involvement and more aid, the report warned against "relying on piecemeal action," and that the US should continue to think of Greece in the context of a global struggle. The whole Greek operation was teetering like an acrobat on the high wire, with the "possibility of gradually inching forward towards the reestablishment of order and economic recovery...or...the possibility of total military and economic collapse." Finally, the report called for the United States to quit the defensive posturing, and stop "apologizing for the...allegedly "monarcho-fascist" Greek Government."<sup>43</sup> Simultaneously, the NSC report labeled the Greek situation as

"primarily a military and political problem rather than one of reconstruction and economic development."<sup>44</sup>

It seemed that the United States was entering a new stage of involvement in Greece, characterized by a more overt intervention, and a foray into another Greek institution that it had previously hoped to avoid. The last half of 1948 would bring not only continued aid and involvement, but a penetration of the military, and a stronger commitment to a successful resolution to the conflict. Additionally, a major change to the American mission was made midway through 1948. In the Spring, Griswold resigned as head of AMAG, and Henry Grady was appointed as Ambassador. Grady had served in Greece as chief of the AMFOGE so he was familiar with the situation there. He was also given full control of AMAG in order "to concentrate responsibility for all aspects in one administrator in order to achieve coordination of United States efforts in Greece and concentration of United States bargaining power vis-a-vis the Greek Government."<sup>45</sup>

An important side show that was played out internal to the American Mission in 1948-1949, helps to illustrate the pervasive powers, or the perception of such powers, of the American officials operating in Greece. At about the same time as Griswold retired from his duty as Chief of AMAG, and Henry Grady was appointed as both Ambassador and Chief of AMAG, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) appointed John Nuveen as its director of operations in Greece. The Grady-Nuveen relationship

quickly deteriorated and conflict ensued, reminiscent of the Griswold-MacVeagh affair of the previous year. Nuveen represented the "total intervention" method of diplomacy, while Grady believed in the softer, more diplomatic approach. The Nuveen-Grady struggle for power reached its peak in January of 1949 when the ECA director got involved in some political intrigue of his own. With Grady in Washington, Averell Harriman, then serving as the special representative for ECA in Europe, travelled to Athens to meet with Nuveen. The two ECA men then plotted an attempt to influence a change in the Greek Government. With Nuveen convincing Harriman that the US aid program needed tougher Greek Leadership, the men called on King Paul to dissolve the government and form a dictatorship under General Papagos. Papagos was a strong, right-wing general with dictatorial tendencies who had been mentioned before--especially by American military leaders like General Van Fleet--as a possible solution to Greece's problems. The "suggestion" was accompanied by the assertion that without a stronger government, "American aid might be in jeopardy." When Grady returned to Athens he was furious that they had overstepped their bounds, and had given what could easily be misconstrued as an official approval for the overthrow of a parliamentary government. Grady demanded explanations, but received very little in the way of satisfactory answers. He was nonetheless convinced that, "Both are reported to have pressed their well known (to me) views. Both are reported to have insisted on drastic solution (along lines of their views) if aid

to Greece is to continue."<sup>46</sup>

This action is significant in that it provides yet another example of the degree of power which not only the Ambassador wielded, but was held by many different American officials working in Greece or in Washington. All had their own perceptions of the Greek political system and leaders, and all had their own ideas as to how that system and those leaders could be manipulated. The power was manifested in aid money, and in the Greeks' fear that it might be withdrawn. The "power of the purse" was used continually by American officials in Greece as leverage that could be applied to influence all actions in support of US interests. In fact, by the end of 1948 this "leverage" had been used so often that it prompted George McGhee, the coordinator for aid to Greece and Turkey, to state:

"I do not believe it necessary or desirable to threaten to withdraw aid totally, since I believe it would be against our ultimate interests if the threat had to be carried out and in my opinion there is adequate bargaining power in threatening to reduce or change the nature of the aid, which makes unnecessary the use of the bargaining power of total withdrawal."<sup>47</sup>

Ambassador Grady's opposition to a Papagos government had one other possible motive, besides his dislike of the overt intervention of those officials who attempted to usurp his power as ambassador. If Papagos was installed as a dictator, it was

very likely that his regime would be much more difficult to influence than what existed at that time. This was seemingly the official view of the State Department, as John Jenergan, the Assistant Chief of the Near Eastern Division, pointed out:

"I feel we should be under no illusions as to the probable character of a Papagos-Markezinis government or take too much stock in any pledge by the King to prevent such a regime would probably be less responsive to American influence and desire than its more pliable predecessor; that errors would be less easily corrected, and that failure of the regime might well entail collapse of the whole Greek political structure, including the throne."<sup>48</sup>

Grady then applied great pressure on the King to reverse any ideas that the Harriman-Nuveen action may have inspired. Taking his involvement one step further, he pressured Prime Minister Sophoulis and the King to reorganize the cabinet and form a new coalition. Grady referred to this new government as: "The best we have had since the elections three years ago...which has justified our action...We kept officially in the background but our force was fully felt."<sup>49</sup>

AMAG's influence was not only political in nature. During the Civil War American officials knew it was very important to control the American and Greek press. This was evidenced by the meeting Griswold held with American newspapermen prior to departing for Greece in 1947. Griswold wanted to impress on them the importance of a "friendly" press in promoting the Greek aid

program. Additionally, the initial agreement called for "Representatives of the press and radio of the United States to observe freely and to report fully regarding utilization of such assistance." Typically, press coverage was not as positive as hoped for, making diplomatic efforts more difficult.

US control measures especially extended to the Greek press. The Greek Government exercised control over its own press, and the American team controlled the Greek Government. In December of 1948 Grady stated to the Secretary of State, "I am taking steps to strengthen press censorship of military matters."<sup>50</sup> Numerous times Greek politicians wanted to announce certain positive actions such as troop increases, but were denied that authority to proceed. In the Fall of 1948 Tsaldaris asked Grady "for permission" to announce a potential expansion of the army to give the people renewed hope, but was denied permission by Grady. The press report was never made.<sup>51</sup>

Both Griswold's and Grady's "behind-the-scenes" pressures had become a commonplace tactic for American officials dealing with the Greek situation. With the large amount of aid money pouring into Greece, American officials felt an obligation to ensure there was a compliance with the American agenda. The objective was to secure an appropriate response from the greek Government, or as George McGhee stated, "to continue to utilize the Greeks as an instrument of our policy."<sup>52</sup>



In the beginning the United States tried to search for a balance between aiding Greece without intervening in its affairs, and insuring success by direct involvement and control. The US hoped to avoid infringing on Greek sovereignty knowing that excessive interference would only engender hostility.

On a global scale it soon became evident however, that the US Government would have to shelve some of its high-minded ideals and moral principles, if that is what drove the decision on Greece. Although the decision was not devoid of moral ideas and ideals, it was clearly a move based on US interest. In effect, the time had come to play hardball--"Realpolitik." Intervention in Greece would be the perfect opportunity for the US to successfully execute a specific plan drawn from the stated goals and objectives of the Truman Doctrine. Intervention in Greece would be the vehicle for US opposition to the Soviet Union. And finally, intervention in Greece would be the only way to satisfy the accountability requirements demanded by the American people and congress, and the only way to gain their continued support for either the aid package itself, or more importantly, the Doctrine.

In the specific objective area, it was clearly the dilemma of the lesser of two evils. Either the United States hands over the aid package to Greece with limited involvement, and risks losing Greece and the aid money; or assistance is given with American strings attached so as to insure success.

The perception that the Greek system--governmental, social

economic and military--was broken, that a large part of the responsibility lay with the incompetence of the Greek leaders themselves, and that the acceptable standards were so much lower than what is expected in an American operation, were cause for a condescending treatment of the Greek Government. This condescending attitude of the American policy makers accounted for the belief that success of the Greek aid program could only come through the institution of pervasive controls in Greece. American prejudice toward the Greek situation was manifested in American officials' perceptions of the Greek leaders. This "American perception" was displayed time and again in the relationship between Acheson and Tsaldaris, the reports of Paul Porter and Dwight Griswold, and in the cables and letters of Ambassador MacVeagh, among others.

The Greek Government's behavior throughout 1947-1949 did little to calm fears, dispel ill feelings, or change the perceptions of the US officials. Their continued groveling in partisan politics, and their adamant opposition to a broad based, moderate government that could work for the good of country, amazed the Americans, and added to the negative perceptions. This in turn, further influenced US policy, bringing forth tighter controls and more American influence peddling. Griswold and AMAG had set the tone for American intervention in Greece. The aggressive and proactive involvement that Griswold became known for continued throughout 1948 and long after he left.

"Too frequently the mind vacillates between unpleasant

choices and escapes through procrastination" Dean Acheson once wrote.<sup>53</sup> Acheson was well aware of the lack of virtues demonstrated by the Greek Government. Of all the officials, he probably harbored the dimmest, and most negative views of its ability to successfully embark upon a program of reconstruction. That is precisely why he was so vocal in his support of an aid package for Greece, and why later, he could easily rationalize America's intervention there. He was able to apply the Cold War conflict to the Greek situation, knowing that support to the reactionary regime, and heavy American intervention was the "better of evils," and served the US interest. This was Realpolitik at its best.

1. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise To Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 86.
2. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), Volume V: *The Near East and Africa* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 41, 76-77, 87.
3. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 118.
4. Ibid., 108.
5. Ibid., 115.
6. Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48.
7. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 182-185.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 49.
10. Ibid., 90.
11. Ibid., 90
12. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 174, 175; and FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 120. Others, to include many close to the democratic administration's foreign policy plans and operations, voiced some skepticism with the Truman Doctrine. Among them, were such notables as Bernard Baruch, James Byrnes, and John Foster Dulles.
13. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 128.
14. Ibid., 132.
15. Ibid., 136-137.
16. Ibid.
17. Iatrides, 244-245, 404.
18. Wittner, 101-102; and Iatrides, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, 717-718. Governor Griswold had considerable power and influence among many politicians, and his "connections" even included a friendship with the President dating back to their service together in WWI. His appointment apparently was made to appease the Republican Congress, but also was the result of his political connections, despite protestations of some of the Presidents more influential advisors. He was not an expert on Greece, nor was he particularly schooled in economic matters, and finally, his

selection was made without Ambassador MacVeagh's knowledge.

19. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 215-216.

20. Ibid., 219-224. The entire top secret directive is included in FRUS.

21. Ibid. The text of the directive was strong both in effecting change in the Greek Government, and also in stepping slowly and carefully to "avoid interventionist actions," or rather to avoid making it look like intervention. There were some conflicting signals being sent to Griswold from the start.

22. Ibid., 228.

23. Yiannis P. Roubatis, *Tangled Webs, The U.S. in Greece, 1947-1967* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., Inc., 1987), 43.

24. Ibid, 41.

25. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 252.

26. Ibid., 262. There are numerous comments on the Greek propensity to talk things to death and still not have a solution. After one session with Greek leaders Marshall commented, "The interviews were protracted because of [the] Greeks verbosity." Even MacVeagh tired of their manner stating that "The modern Greeks must be the wordiest of mortals; too bad they haven't studied their own classics to better advantage" (Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, 605).

27. Ibid., 265.

28. Wittner, 136-144. Exact figures are not known, but from 1947 to 1949 military court-martials alone totalled 36,920. This does not include arrests and trials under civil law. Additionally, there were 7,810 death sentences handed down by the courts, of which an estimated 3,136 were actually carried out. Not included in these figures are the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of deaths resulting from small scale, local reprisals conducted by right-wing groups, and tolerated by the Government. It should be noted that the left too was guilty of as many, if not more, acts of terror.

29. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 169, 170.

30. Ibid., 196-198, 203.

31. Wittner, 187-188; FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 142-143; and Truman, *Memoirs*, 109. Truman commented that the Greeks "would have given all our aid to the military if we had let them do it."

32. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 295-296.

33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 252.
35. Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, 661.
36. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 368-370; and Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, 725-727. Griswold and AMAG were profiled in a New York Times article as having great influence and power.
37. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Volume VI (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 210.
38. Iatrides, Greece In The 1940's, 249; and FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 378.
39. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 379.
40. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 3.
41. Ibid., 9-11.
42. Ibid., 12.
43. Ibid., 439, 440, 447.
44. Ibid., 14.
45. Wittner, 119.
46. Michael Amen, American Foreign Policy in Greece, 1944-1949: Economic, Military, and Institutional Aspects (Frankfurt: European University Papers, 1978), 186-193; FRUS, 1949, vol. V, 238; Jones, A new Kind of War, 194-195.
47. FRUS, 1948, vol. I, Part 1: General, the UN, 204.
48. Nikolaos, A. Stavrou, Allied Politics and Military Interventions: The political Role of the Greek Military (Athens: Papazissas Publishers, 1976), 78-79; and FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 187.
49. Amen, 193
50. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 212.
51. Ibid., 181-182.
52. Jones, A New Kind of War, 139.
53. David S. Mclellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976), 116.

CHAPTER FOUR

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AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

In the previous chapters I have shown how American interest in Greece grew into general involvement in Greek affairs, and finally led to direct intervention in the political and economic sectors. I examined the relationships between many of the key players in both the American and Greek governments, and focused especially on the perceptions of the American officials in endeavoring to explain how official policy was affected by unofficial perceptions.

In this final look at American intervention in Greece, I will discuss the effects of American military involvement on US policy. Specifically, policy towards Greece in the final years of the Civil War. To accomplish this, several questions are obvious. How did the United States arrive at the decision to send American military advisors to Greece? What exactly was their mission there? How did the attitudes and perceptions of the US military leaders influence American policy? The answers to those questions tell us much about the Truman Doctrine and the aid package to Greece, both on the level of Greek-American relations, and in the realm of US-Soviet relations.

The decision to send military assistance soon became evident. It was clear that economic rehabilitation could not proceed without first securing the country. Otherwise, reconstruction would be set back every time the communist guerrillas destroyed a bridge, a railroad, or any part of the infrastructure. Additionally, the public's confidence had to be restored.<sup>1</sup> "Fear" was holding them hostage and creating a



"condition of helplessness" as described by Porter in his initial report to the State Department.

For these reasons the military problem in Greece was perhaps the most important, and the solution of that problem was most vital to the future of Greece. This was reflected in the breakdown of expenditures for fiscal year 1947, dedicated to the reconstruction of Greece as a result of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. In accordance with the Bill, \$172 million was committed for military assistance, while only \$128 million was utilized for economic assistance. This figure does not even include a fiscal year '49 "supplemental appropriation" of \$200 million, purely for military assistance.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, as testimony to the priority that the American mission gave to the military option, out of an AMAG Staff of 425, 242 were military personnel from the War Department, while only 183 were civilians.

In addition, the Greek army's problems were acute. As discussed in chapter I, at the end of the German occupation the professional Greek army was virtually nonexistent. By 1946 it had gone through such a dark period and suffered so many setbacks, that there was no corps of professional officers, and no trained units except for one brigade of infantry that had not been on Greek soil for almost four years. Even that unit was severely impaired in that its officers and men had been politicized, and thus tainted during the war. The unit was used as a tool by both the forces of the Right in exile, and the Leftist resistance forces. In 1936 the Metaxas Dictatorship had purged the officer

corps of all those with anything but royalist loyalties. Added to this was the losses suffered in the Italian War, the defeat by Germany, and the onset of a harsh occupation. The result from these combined catastrophes was the creation of a large vacuum in the professional Greek army that was filled by the resistance movement dominated by the left. At the same time the government forces were led by old, professionally outdated senior officers who had not remained in Greece to fight with the resistance, thus had lost credibility with the people. Many of the junior leaders had been tainted by their service in the collaborationist "Security Battalions" during the occupation, thus they were also a negative influence with little credibility. Finally, there was no core cadre, no skeletal units to build on, and no modern equipment with which to outfit the army.

In a February 21, 1947 memo to the Secretary of State, titled "Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece," Acheson recommended that the US furnish Greece with military equipment because Britain was unable to do so.<sup>3</sup> Acheson's memo coincided with the British Aide Memoire which also requested that the US supply the Greek army. Throughout March and April the Administration studied the feasibility of providing arms and equipment to Greece but only for "reestablishing internal order."<sup>4</sup> This equipment was necessary in light of Greece's temporary increase of forces immediately following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. As the Greek-Turkish Aid

Bill became effective, the first military advisory group departed for Greece. The group consisted of 25 officers, 3 enlisted men, and 15 War Department civilians. It was designated the War Department of the United States Mission to Greece, or more simply, the United States Army Group-Greece (USAGG), and was commanded by Colonel Charles Lehner.<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to note that neither the Greek "request" for aid (drawn up by the State Department), nor the contract of agreement make any mention of the employment of a military advisory group in Greece. The Truman administration was starting to turn in a new direction to help solve the Greek problem, but was doing so in a unilateral manner. In reality, the Government of Greece played no part in these new developments.

#### **USAGG**

Lehner and the advisory group worked closely with British military authorities during 1947 giving guidance to the Greek armed forces. Initial involvement was limited to the concurrence of the Greek army's increase of 20,000 soldiers made in June of 1947.<sup>6</sup> Such aid and liaison work existed without any special "working arrangements" or "definition of responsibilities."<sup>7</sup> Lehner's War Department group acted very informally, but were not without their own impressions. Lehner's perception was that although the Greek armed forces were admittedly in poor shape, there was "nothing wrong with Greece that time, forceful U.S.

guidance and American dollars will not correct."<sup>8</sup> On June 12, 1947, Major General William Livesay replaced Lehner as the military commander at AMAG.<sup>9</sup> Livesay was appointed so as to satisfy the rank conscious Greek army and so that American military advice might be more effective.

Livesay immediately got involved in Greek military matters advising Governor Griswold to turn down the request of the Greek General Staff for an increase in their armed forces. In July 1947, AMAG (American Mission for Aid to Greece) was not convinced that Greece needed to enlarge their forces. Additionally Livesay and Griswold believed it would not financially be possible for the US to support this enlargement, and would only siphon off money being used for economic aid.<sup>10</sup> Livesay and Griswold felt that the Greek army was not utilizing "all available strength," nor was it being effectively engaged against bandits," rather its difficulties resulted from its own failures of tactics and command.<sup>11</sup> The Greek army already outnumbered the guerrillas by a 5:1 ratio. This accusation became a recurring matter for the US advisors. Added to this problem was the British threat to withdraw its remaining troops in Greece. This irritated US policy makers, and the threat alone proved to be a catalyst in the subsequent American buildup of its team of advisers. By August 1947, Ambassador MacVeagh cabled Secretary Marshall that "in opinion of highly placed US military officer Greece...if British troops withdrawn and not replaced with at least equal numbers of US, "we might as well pack up and go home."<sup>12</sup> Faced with imminent

withdrawal of all British forces, the military advisors of AMAG believed that the Greek army would not be able to shoulder the burden. On August 5, Griswold, obviously listening to his military advisors, recommended that "United States should furnish troops of slightly greater strength than those [of Great Britain's] withdrawn," and that all military training in Greece be under United States leadership.<sup>13</sup> Griswold believed that this would improve morale and allow for better coordination of the whole program. These initial military decisions illustrate the power the American mission had to influence internal Greek affairs as a result of US involvement. In accordance with the US-Greek agreement, the Greek Government could make no unilateral decisions which affected the disposition of any aid funds whatsoever. Approval from the US mission was required prior to any action.

Again, in late August General Livesay emphasized the fact that the Greek General Staff was not making full use of the army's troop strength, and that they "...still give great amount of time to political considerations and to presentation of arguments for an increase" (to armed forces strength).<sup>14</sup> The major concern with increasing the troop strength was the cost involved in training, paying, feeding, and outfitting the soldiers. This would entail another big shift of monies to the already bloated military budget. Additionally, the US wanted to avoid the perception that it was the driving force behind any Greek army increase. This would surely point to intervention and

undue influence, something the United States was not yet ready to have exposed. Livesay was already irritated at the General Staff's lack of desire to take the fight to the guerrillas. He even recommended giving the Greek army some additional reconnaissance planes and aviation equipment so they would not have any more excuses for their lack of success.<sup>15</sup> In his frustration however, Livesay began to think that the only solution would be to allow the Greeks the increase in troop strength. He concluded that "the present strength army is not going to be properly and vigorously utilized," and furthermore, "...failure of the army to suppress the bandits will be placed squarely on our shoulders for refusing the requested increases."<sup>16</sup>

At the end of August 1947, MacVeagh sent an alarming telegram to Secretary Marshall outlining the deplorable state of the Greek army, the recent gains made by the guerrillas, and the rapid deterioration of the situation that would soon render the Greek army helpless, and overcome by events. Accompanying his assessment was the first recommendation for a significant change to the American military advisory group:

"...perhaps larger staff military observers, to be attached Embassy so as to be free of limited logistical view imposed [on] AMAG, and under superior officer of broader vision and higher authority than present Military Attache..."<sup>17</sup>

Macveagh finished his message with an exhortation to not "risk

falling into British error of "too little and too late."

As the United States went through the decision making process of whether or not to send American advisors, there was some hesitation on the idea of replacing British troops with US soldiers. The critical question was whether "the introduction of United States forces into Greece would really help the situation or would be disturbing and provocative."<sup>18</sup> Without a doubt, sending even a team of advisors to Greece would draw international attention. There were several other reasons why the United States hesitated to commit US military personnel to the struggle in Greece. First was the still lingering belief that Greece was traditionally in the British sphere. An extension to that belief was the hope that Great Britain would keep its troops in Greece to handle the military side of the operation. If the United States showed that it was too ready and willing, the British might pull their troops out rather quickly. It was one thing to feel obligated to assist Greece in its economic reconstruction efforts, or to recognize it as a strategic interest that warranted economic support, but it was another thing entirely to cross the line to a military commitment where American lives would be at risk, not to mention negative public and world opinion. Additionally, there was the question of how and when America would extricate itself once it became mired in a war with no end in sight. And there was always the chance of escalation to a full scale war. The American Government was convinced that the Greeks had to do their own fighting, but at

the same time, accept US tactical advice and training. The plan to send US troops was never disclosed to the Greeks for this reason. All the telegrams that travelled between Greece and the United States prior to the commitment of the US advisory team recommended first that Britain be persuaded to keep its military mission and troops in Greece, and then only in the absence of the British, that the US commit an operational advisory team, and perhaps even military units to replace Great Britain.

In another urgent, top secret telegram to Secretary Marshall on September 15, Griswold recommended that the US authorize an increase of 20,000 soldiers for the Greek National Army (GNA), along with a total of \$31 million to be transferred to the military. He also strongly recommended that General Livesay "be provided with [an] adequate planning staff," and that the "scope of his instructions be broadened to give him authority to advise GNA to maximum extent permitted by the law." Griswold made no secret of his support for American military operational involvement:

"Forceful measures this time may avert necessity [of] more dangerous and costly measures later. Time has come when operational advice must be furnished [to] Greek forces through officers attached Greek Staff and appropriate tactical units ...An offensive spirit and beneficial tactical advice would tend to eliminate continued ineffective military operations which play directly into Communist hands... Urgently recommend promptest dispatch 125 to 200 American army officers...to advise GNA staff and tactical units."19



Griswold further warned that if the move was not made quickly, "Greek morale will nosedive." As the man who originally felt that Greece was expending too much of its time and efforts on military matters while the country was crumbling around them, he had been converted. He now was the most ardent supporter of American military involvement in Greece, but only under his conditions, which meant a military group subordinate to his own AMAG.

Griswold closed out the message above with, "Naturally Greeks were not informed." His intentions in the military arena were no less interventionist than the designs he harbored for solutions to the economic and political problems in Greece. Thus, even by the middle of September 1947, Griswold was seeking unilateral action to deal with military situation. He was as doubtful and pessimistic of the abilities of Greece's military leaders as he was of its political leaders.

Trusting in the advice and reports of his military group advisor General Livesay, Griswold drafted several negative reports regarding the Greek Army's performance. They showed a general lack of offensive spirit in the Greek army which resulted from, or maybe caused, the poor disposition and malutilization of units, all of which were constantly in a static defense mode, thus surrendering the initiative to the guerrillas. In addition, he noted political interference in military matters in everything from the constant changes of the high level commanders to pressure to guard certain villages or locations. Finally, Griswold simply believed that the Greek military commanders, from

the top down to the junior leadership level, were not professionally competent.<sup>20</sup>

Griswold was now "convinced AMAG must give increased attention and effort to military situation."<sup>21</sup>As he stated, the situation was a "matter of immediate urgency," as US interests were at stake. Griswold's turnabout resulted from several things. First he was convinced of the tenuous position of the Greek army, and the Greek Governments inability to guarantee a secure state. Without such security, AMAG could not carry-out economic and political reforms, nor any lasting reconstruction projects. Griswold, by December 1947, seemed to be at the same decision point that he had earlier accused the Greek Government of-- subordinating all else to the bandit war. Griswold finally agreed that it was truly impossible to make progress in all areas simultaneously. In a note to the Secretary of State he reprioritized AMAG objectives as: a) prompt defeat of Greek bandits; b) reestablishment of internal security; c) prevention of economic collapse; d) rehabilitation of Greece. In meeting these objectives Griswold warned, "each day's delay prolongs danger and jeopardizes result."<sup>22</sup>

A second reason that the AMAG chief may have changed his mind about supporting a military solution to the Greek situation, involves "politics" Griswold may have thought that if he opposed a military solution and one was needed anyway, he might lose control of the advisory group operating in Greece. Thus, Griswold supported a military mission in-country, but was vehemently

opposed to that group assuming a separate status. He insisted that a military advisory group fall under AMAG, warning that any alternative would result in a lack of unity of command and control; would give the Greeks a chance to play the military and economic missions against each other; and would be "fraught with political dangers."<sup>23</sup> This second reason was influenced by Griswold's desire to control all aspects of the aid package.

Lastly Griswold was so convinced that the United States must influence some kind of military solution that he requested broader powers for General Livesay to advise the Greek General Staff in operational matters. Prior to that time, the AMAG military group, USAGG, was limited purely to matters of supply and logistics.<sup>24</sup>

Concurrent with Griswold's reports was the War Department report of General Chamberlin. After seeing the action first-hand, Chamberlin surmised that the greatest threat in Greece was a military threat. To answer this threat Chamberlin recommended that military problems be given priority over the development of any broad economic program. Furthermore, he outlined several steps that needed to be taken at once:

1. US approval of the development of a Home Guard;
2. US order for the Gendarmerie to be released from Greek Army Control and returned to its police function;
3. The immediate formation of a US Advisory and Planning group subordinate to Ambassador, but reporting directly to the joint chiefs of

Staff (JCS);

4. The establishment of groups of US Army "observers" assigned to the Greek Army to energize operational action, restore offensive spirit, and advise on planning and operations. 25

Based on Griswold's telegram the State Department authorized the increase in Greek army strength, and the War Department began to choose officers for duty in Greece as operational "observers." Additionally General Chamberlain was ordered to examine the necessity of issuing new directives to Livesay to allow him to reorganize his staff from a logistics center to an operational command so as to better operate as an operations advisor to the Greek army and US ambassador. The State Department also gave Chamberlin instructions to "feel free to offer comments and recommendations on all matters connected with our national objectives in Greece...any suggestions [you] might have for broad changes in our approach to the Greek problem will be welcome."<sup>26</sup> Recognizing that the Greek situation was quickly becoming almost purely a military problem, the State Department realized that it was imperative that the War Department be included on any planning. Additionally, an increase to the military budget was no longer seen as a foolish expenditure.

General Chamberlin's view of a "separate military agency, nominally responsible to senior representative of US Government in Greece but reporting directly to JCS," did not fit Griswold's idea of how the military program should work. However, Ambassador Macveagh did agree with Chamberlin citing the "limited objectives

of AMAG organization," as a hindrance to the goals and objectives of an advisory team.<sup>27</sup> This disagreement with Griswold proved to be the last nail in the coffin for MacVeagh. He was removed from his position by the end of 1947.

Throughout this period, it is amazing to note that the discussion on developing a US military advisory capability rarely, if at all, considered the target country. There was discussion on the chain of command for the proposed military group, on broadening the powers of the commander, on the assignment of the observers, but nothing was asked of the Greek Government. It was understood that by accepting the aid package, Greece would have to submit to any action deemed necessary for the success of the Greek-Turkish aid program. By the end of 1947, this included United States military intervention. Convinced that the Greek army leaders did not have the abilities, this intervention allowed for American control in increasing or decreasing the strength of the military, assigning and promoting high level commanders, the disposition and movement of units, and later would lead to control over all operational aspects of the Greek army.

Events moved quickly at the end of 1947. By the end of October the administration had initially decided to make the military group a separate headquarters, not under the guidance or jurisdiction of AMAG, and sent such instructions to Griswold. This was the same set of instructions that attempted to delineate the duties of Macveagh and Griswold and placed AMAG subordinate

to the Embassy. Griswold refused, threatened to resign, and President Truman rescinded his order. Control of USAGG went back to AMAG and Griswold.

The continued poor performance of the Greek Army left no choice but decisive action. General Livesay's observations of the Greek forces included: "much inertia and a habit of fighting at long range instead of coming to grips with the guerrillas,"<sup>28</sup> that the Greeks' "continued cry is for more and more of everything,"<sup>29</sup> and a wry comment that "for some reason Greek troops always seem to fight with more determination when foreign officers are present."<sup>30</sup>

The negative perception of the Greek military establishment effected a new American policy initiative to deal with the Greek situation. The Truman administration now redirected official policy, placing more emphasis on the military situation in order to bring about a swift finish to the civil war and begin reconstruction efforts. In December approval was given for the formation of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group-Greece (JUSMAPG), and on January 5 it became effective with General Livesay as the director.

#### **JUSMAPG-GREECE**

In the January 6, 1948 top secret position paper on Greece the National Security Council reported:

"The armed forces of Greece, both military and police units are hampered in their effort to eliminate Communist guerilla forces by a lack of offensive spirit by political interference, by disposition of units as static guard forces and by poor leadership, particularly in the lower echelons."<sup>31</sup>

America's military efforts were gaining steam. Although Livesay was assigned as the first JUSMAPG Commander in December 1947 the War Department was actively seeking another candidate. In late January James Van Fleet was chosen. Van Fleet was a veteran Corps Commander of WWII known for his fighting abilities and his uncompromising ways. In General Marshall's words, he was the "more impressive personality" the Americans had been searching for. Livesay was an excellent logistician, but with American involvement entering a new, more active stage, he did not fit the bill. Livesay was asked to remain in Greece to head the logistics portion of JUSMAPG, but he requested relief from all his duties, feeling that for him to stay on in Greece would compromise both himself and the military advisory group. His relief was supported by Griswold "because of Greek psychology which will embarrass Livesay and make him ineffective in Greece."<sup>32</sup>

With the establishment of JUSMAPG the duties and influence of USAGG were greatly expanded giving the military mission real power backed up by military resources, and independent of all other political or economic agencies operating in Greece. This action marked a beginning of American reliance on a military solution to realize its objectives in Greece. US policy makers

knew that an effective conclusion to the Greek situation would only come via a total military victory over the leftist rebels. Since the Greek army was lacking in its abilities and capabilities, the Truman administration was convinced that operational assistance was a necessary step to success in Greece.

Throughout the Winter months of 1948, Van Fleet and his corps of advisors continued to improve the morale and performance of the Greek army by stressing discipline, the offensive spirit, and training. In May 1948 Van Fleet requested, and received, an increase in JUSMAPG personnel raising the total to 274 for the army, 7 for the navy and 18 for the air force.<sup>33</sup> This increase allowed for more advisors to be put in the field with Greek units and for Van Fleet "to be able to concentrate on the tactical situation."<sup>34</sup> A combat experienced soldier, Van Fleet knew that some American advisors must operate below division level--at the Brigade, Battalion, and even company level--in order to effectively advise and observe operations, and insure that American "advice" was carried out. A JUSMAPG report from June 16, 1948 confirms this pervasive American control:

"American Army Officers will be in field with GNA units to safeguard against possible GNA excesses or failure to comply with instructions."<sup>35</sup>

This statement goes far in explaining what the Americans



considered "advice and observation." There were very few areas, if any, that were off limits to the Americans, and the command influence they wielded. At times this very active advisory role placed US army personnel in some compromising positions. In a war, there is a very thin line between being in the combat zone to observe and advise only, and being there as an actual combatant. One Lieutenant Colonel found himself--in the heat of the battle--leading a rifle platoon in an assault on a hilltop. Because of JUSMAPG's combat exclusion rules for all its officers, he was promptly transferred out of country in the hope of avoiding any international repercussions. In another case, a Lieutenant Colonel was riding as an "observer" on a Greek close air support aircraft which was shot down by the rebels. His stripped and mutilated body was later found not far from the crash site.<sup>36</sup> Both of these more celebrated cases, and countless other instances much like them, demonstrate the direct action and heavy intervention that was utilized by the military faction of the aid group to influence and control events that were clearly in the Greek sphere.

Additionally, Van Fleet imbued his officers with a sense of flexibility and independence of action which allowed them to make critical operational decisions on their own, without the hinderance and restrictions of higher command authority. This heavy infusion of Van Fleet influence and American military competency caused Griswold to comment that the "leading factor in improved GNA morale and demonstrated fighting ability has been

presence US army officers in field as advisers."<sup>37</sup>

Van Fleet's expertise even extended to the Greek Army personnel system. Convinced that the army had too many old and incompetent Generals, he encouraged the Supreme National Defense Council (SNDC) to take the army through a major reorganization with an emphasis on the forced retiring of those Generals. With Van Fleet's approval, all Lieutenant Generals (but one) were placed on the retirement list, and a new crop of Major Generals were promoted. In that fashion, Van Fleet hoped to infuse the army with a new fighting spirit adequately led from the top.<sup>38</sup> At the same time Van Fleet secured a position for himself on the SNDC, and an unwritten "agreement" that provided for Anglo-American military advice to be promptly acted upon, or referred to civilian leaders, which included the American ambassador, the chief of AMAG, and the Premier.<sup>39</sup> Van Fleet's initial steps went much farther than what was originally expected of the American military establishment. He and his advisors now had a direct hand, in fact were almost co-commanders, in deciding general questions relating to the appointment and relief of Greek army officers, the positioning of units, tactics and strategy, increasing or decreasing the size of the army, and a host of other actions.

The American general's influence took even more direct forms as the Civil War grew in intensity. During the Summer of 1948, as the battle for the Grammos mountain range was in full swing, Van

Fleet visited the front lines with several VIP's from Washington. What he found was a stalemate in the fighting. Under orders from the Greek commander Lieutenant General Kalogeropoulos, the Greek army offensive was at a virtual standstill, and for no apparent reason. This had not been Van Fleet's intent for the conduct of the campaign--he had made it clear that the army must always be on the offensive, pressing and pursuing the guerrillas so they had no chance to recover or regroup. Van Fleet's response was swift. He immediately went to the Greek National Defense Council and insisted that Kalogeropoulos be relieved of command, and replaced with a more able commander.

Van Fleet went on another foray to address the personnel and leadership problems of the GNA in January 1949. Still utterly convinced that Greek army problems lay with the issue of command, he pushed for a strong commander-in-chief with greatly expanded powers. His choice was General Papagos, a right-wing officer who had been the hero of the war against Italy. Although other American officials were unsure of Papagos's legitimacy, steps were taken, primarily at the urging of Van Fleet, to negotiate with the Greek general and offer him command. Finally agreeing with many of Papagos's strong demands and conditions for his acceptance, American officials arranged to have him appointed as Commander-In-Chief. Not fully at ease with the decision, and fearfull of his new powers, the Greek Government nevertheless commented that Papagos's "...prestige, devotion to King, and absence of affiliation with any political party would, with full

authority in military matters, improve situation."<sup>40</sup>

All of these military advisory group actions contributed to the total penetration of the Greek military, and paved the way for almost total control of its actions. Van Fleet was definitely the "more impressive figure" the American Government had been looking for. He commanded a great deal of respect and loyalty from the Greek army. It was widely held that his quiet "nod" at the war council meetings constituted a right answer. Convinced that the entire aid program depended on Greek military success in the field, and the subsequent security that resulted from that success, American policy continued to be one of bolstering the army with economic support, and most critically, with advisory support.

This decision to establish JUSMAPG as an operational headquarters stopped short of committing US combat forces in Greece however. At the same moment that the United States was reorganizing the military group in Greece, there was a strong debate going on in the State Department on the question of committing combat forces. The issue was split between two opposing camps, represented by two veteran foreign service officers. The director of the Near Eastern and African Affairs office, Loy Henderson, was strongly in favor of using US troops to influence the action in Greece. His chief antagonist was George Kennan who held the position that: US troops might be ineffective and then failure would be the responsibility of the

United States; extraction of those troops would be difficult and confusing; and finally, that US policy was not consistent because the administration was unwilling to use force in other trouble spots around the world. Throughout 1948 the administration argued the benefits of a stronger response in Greece, but never quite arrived at a solution. By the end of the year both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC opposed the idea as being "military unsound," thus it died and was not resurrected again.<sup>41</sup>

It is important to note that the debate regarding the active engagement of US forces in Greece again omitted the Greek Government. It was clearly a unilateral decision based purely on US interest. At no time was the Greek Government consulted, even for input. The major reason for this was the US viewpoint that Greece was only a piece of the puzzle. It was only one section on the chessboard, and any move contemplated there had to take into consideration the impact it may have on the rest of the board. Introducing US combat forces in that country applied to the bigger picture of containing Soviet Communism, and was not a decision based on Greek internal security. If American forces were inserted in Greece it would be in answer to the continued threat from the Communist satellite countries along the Greek Border. This was the global picture, and confirmed the fact that Greece was merely a pawn in the game of grand strategy. In November 1948, Ambassador Grady summarized this idea pinpointing the importance of Greece:

"Greek politicians...have spoken of Greece as the focal point on democratic front. Whereas this may have been true eighteen months ago, I believe in our world strategy today, as important as Greece is, ...it deserves to have only secondary consideration.<sup>42</sup>

In the decision to apply a military solution to the Greek situation, the US had to keep this in mind. Every move on the battlefield was actually a counteraction to the Soviets.

Once the military solution was realized as the necessary first step in Greece, both the political and economic efforts had to be re-thought. There could not be a competition between the military problems and a reconstruction program for several reasons. First, there existed the critical aspect of funding--there was just not enough money to have two top priorities. Secondly, if any program was to be successful, there must be a unity of effort with all agencies in Greece supporting a single policy with a singular purpose. Lastly, and perhaps most important in the context of American involvement in Greece during that period, the military solution influenced both political and economic decisions because of the overriding concern of protecting US interest. American involvement was not primarily based on assisting the Greek State in its efforts to rebuild, or to restructure its political foundations. Those too were objectives, but they were not top priorities. In a February 16, 1948 message to Congress, President Truman stated:

"Owing to the Communist obstruction it is increasingly clear, however, that economic recovery in Greece must await the establishment of internal security. Although Economic programs most effective under the circumstances will contrive to be actively prosecuted, the benefits from them can be fully realized only when the warfare against the guerrillas has been successfully concluded"<sup>43</sup>

In the context of the world situation--the struggle between the forces of democracy and those of communism--anything less than total victory over the guerrillas in Greece would be a blow to American strategic interests. For this reason, even a political compromise would prostitute American efforts in Greece. If the Government was weak enough to feel a need to compromise, it would not be strong enough to withstand a communist infiltration within its ranks, which would only lead to a loss of Greece at some later time.

Van Fleet's influence also crossed over into the political arena when, as a parting shot he got involved in bringing down the Plastiras government in July 1950. This set the stage for his ally, General Papagos, to eventually step into politics with the new Ellinikos Synaghermos party. As covered in chapter III, the American embassy and State Department, feeling the euphoria of victory, peace, and seemingly overwhelming success with American policy in Greece, attempted to support the liberalization of the Greek Government in 1950. The elections brought defeat for the Right and a coalition of centrist parties to power. After the King refused to accept the agreed upon coalition government with

General Plastiras as premier, Venizelos received the mandate and formed a minority government. It was at that point that Ambassador Grady stepped in, undermined the King and Venizelos government, and forced the resumption of the Plastiras coalition<sup>44</sup>. The intrigue was not to end there however. General Van Fleet, who by this time had formed a close relationship with General Papagos and the King, unequivocally felt that the Plastiras government was much too liberal in its policies, and thus used his influence to force Plastiras out of office once again. Van Fleet had become an avid supporter of the strong-arm methods and forceful personality of Papagos. Because Van Fleet was not a politician, he identified with the resolute Papagos, and felt he was the type of leader Greece needed. He was able to overlook Papagos's inclination to dabble in politics, and since Papagos was an old ally of the King, Van Fleet also supported, and was himself supported by, the Monarchy.<sup>45</sup> Upon departing Greece on July 17 for a new assignment he cabled the Department of the Army:

"...I feel I should report that the present Greek Government is dangerous. Ever since the Plastiras Government was formed the Communists and fellow travellers have gradually regained their morale and influence and many are now in important positions... My recent tour... and conferences with Papagos confirm many alarming moves by the Plastiras government such as Amnesty for dangerous was criminals and the relief of police and gendarmerie officers. It is shocking to me that we support a government which permits red infiltration so soon after so much blood



and money has been spent here to suppress Communist aggression."<sup>46</sup>

Van Fleet's telegram illicited "considerable concern" from the State Department, and Dean Acheson requested that the Embassy comment on those charges. With Ambassador Grady--the chief supporter of the Plastiras government--now gone, the explanation was left to the acting Ambassador, charge Harold Minor, who tried in vain to detail the reasoning of the embassy. By late July Van Fleet was informed in a meeting at the State Department that the "Department...is considering alternative solutions." On August 17, 1950 the Plastiras government fell; a move that was this time supported by the new American Ambassador John Peurifoy. Added support for opposition to Plastiras and his liberal policies came from the fact that the world situation had changed again. The breakout of the Korean War now added more impetus to America's hardline anti-communist policies.

The Greek Government would go through several more confusing iterations, to include another return to a left-center coalition of Plastiras and Venizelos, before turning back to the right and Papagos in 1952. The important thing to note here is the overwhelming influence of General Van Fleet and the military component in Greek affairs, and the manner in which the power of JUSMAPG spread even beyond military affairs. Van Fleet's negative perception of certain Greek politicians and the Athens political intrigue, resulted in his personal intervention in the selection of a government. Penetration of the American military group was

at its zenith.

US Military involvement in Greece was merely another facet of the Greek aid program. It was the third part of a three-part solution aimed at securing American objectives in Greece, but more importantly, in the wider region. Just as economic and political initiatives were undertaken, military assistance was emphasized to protect American interests. A Greek army victory over the leftist rebel army was necessary if political or economic reforms were to take fruit and be effective. Only then could US regional interests be secured. For the same reason, a deployment of US combat forces was deemed not wise. The negative aspects of introducing American combat units in Greece in the context of the world situation, far outweighed anything positive that might have come from such a decision. Not only did the administration fear a strong rebuke internationally, but there were plenty of dissenters right here at home in the US Congress. In the political and economic arenas, intervention is always much easier to disguise. Militarily, once forces are introduced, intervention cannot be hidden. In addition, the American military advisory team was the cheapest way to influence US intervention and affect success.

Simply, JUSMAPG was formed and sent to Greece to operationally advise the Greek army in its fight against the

guerrillas. However, as happens any time an institution is penetrated by a foreign power, there were other dynamics that took place. Although AMAG and the military advisors sought to depoliticize the Army and block Greek politicians from controlling it, what actually took place was that the Greek army began to feel totally separate from the Greek Government. It was this feeling of autonomy that would lead to a perceived superiority, and a disdain for the political leaders. In a certain sense this was encouraged by General Van Fleet and the military advisors of JUSMAPG. Although only interested in the Greek army's performance, not politics, the American tolerance of this type of Greek attitude allowed "military politics" to thrive.<sup>47</sup> As prospects improved for the Greek army, American advisors and Greek commanders began to build a relationship of trust and loyalty. When a Greek commander's American counterpart looked disdainfully at the political leaders and situation in Athens, the Greek officer himself usually did the same.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, the American penetration of the Greek army was carried out on an even grander scale than political or economic penetration. Its effect would be felt for a long time after this period. Additionally, US military leaders strongly influenced American policy, pushing it farther to the "right" in support of more conservative politicians and more dictatorial governments. American military penetration of the Greek army strengthened the institution of the military, which helped break the traditional pattern of political manipulation of the army. However, JUSMAPG's

restructuring of the army did not, in the end, discourage military interest in political intrigue. The buildup of the army would eventually lead to a militarization of politics with the political emergence of Papagos and the Ellinikos Synaghermos Party in 1951, and finally, to the coup d'etat and Colonel's Junta in 1967.

Military initiatives carried out the bulk of US foreign policy work in Greece during the last year of the Civil War. Van Fleet and JUSMAPG were very successful in building an army that was trained, well led, equipped, and motivated enough to seize and hold the initiative. The success of the American military advisory group in affecting the victory of the Greek army was the key to the success of the entire aid program.

1. Jones, A New Kind of War, 47.
2. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union, 76.
3. FRUS, 47,31.
4. Ibid., 180.
5. Ibid., 180.
6. Ibid., 193
7. Ibid., 198.
8. Wittner, 226.
9. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 209.
10. Ibid., 266.
11. Ibid., 273.
12. Ibid, 277.
13. Ibid., 279-280.
14. Ibid., 294.
15. Ibid.
16. Wittner, 227.
17. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 304.
18. Ibid., 335.
19. Ibid., 339.
20. Roubatis, Tangled Webs, 56-57; FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 347; Jones, A Knew Kind of War, 91.
21. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 338.
22. Ibid., 361.
23. Ibid., 363.
24. Ibid., 347.
25. Ibid., 376-377.
26. Ibid., 346.

27. Ibid., 384-385.
28. Ibid., 466-467.
29. Jones, 116.
30. Roubatis, 61.
31. FRUS, 1948, vol.IV, 3.
32. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, East Europe; Soviet Union, 37.
33. Ibid., 96.
34. Ibid, 37
35. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 108.
36. C. M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle For Greece, 1941-1949* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976), 260-261; Jones, *A Knew Kind of War*, 128-129, 192; Wittner, 242.
37. FRUS, 1948, IV, 96
38. Jones, *A New Kind of War*, 159.
39. Wittner, 241-242.
40. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 176; Wittner, 247-248.
41. Jones, 119-120; Wittner, 237-239; FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 64-65.
42. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 189.
43. *Public Papers of The Presidents of The United States, Harry S. Truman, January 1 to December 31, 1948* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 140-141.
44. FRUS, 1950, vol. V, 341,346; see chapter III.
45. Van Fleet had aligned himself with Papagos ever since he influenced the appointment of the Greek General as Commander-in-Chief in January 1949. Additionally, Van Fleet had formed a close relationship with the palace, and was admired by Queen Frederika who seemed to hold much sway with many of the high American officials. See Queen Frederika's book on the Civil War period, A Measure of Understanding, 132.
46. FRUS, 1950, vol. V, 380. General Plastiras and his National Progressive Union of the Center party (EPEK) advocated a liberal policy of clemency and amnesty towards the communists and other political opponents in a supposed hope to bring social and

46. FRUS, 1950, vol. V, 380. General Plastiras and his National Progressive Union of the Center party (EPEK) advocated a liberal policy of clemency and amnesty towards the communists and other political opponents in a supposed hope to bring social and political peace to Greece. This policy was vehemently opposed by Papagos, who believed that he and the army were being undermined by Plastiras.

47. Nikolaos Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions: The Political Role of the Greek Military* (Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 1976), 80.

48. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Katsoudas, eds. *Political Change In Greece, Before and After the Colonels* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 218.

# CONCLUSION

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Dean Acheson once claimed that he had been "present at the creation," in referring to the Truman Doctrine period, which gives testimony to this incredibly eventful time. The years 1946 to 1949 continued to define the international behavior of the United States for decades. The fact that the opening scene of this global struggle for supremacy was played out in Greece makes the study of the Greek Civil War a centerpiece to understanding American foreign policy in the postwar world. It is said that "In a single sentence Truman defined American policy for the next generation and beyond."<sup>1</sup> With the advent of the Cold War, this was no doubt true.

The postwar world was not the stable, secure place all had hoped for. Instead, it was a time characterized by fears, suspicions, and distrust, and marked by the beginning of the Cold War power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The stakes were high in this struggle, and there was no room for second place, but it was not the type of conflict American leaders were familiar with. It was not a war fought openly against the adversarial country, but rather it was a conflict managed through satellite countries, fought by surrogates, and measured, over the longterm, by the number of countries within one's sphere. Additionally, the fight over each country was not ever carried out in a vacuum. Each country, each strategic piece of turf, was directly related to other countries, and greatly impacted on strategic considerations in other parts of the region or world. Finally, although the sovereignty of some

countries was sacrificed, the perception of the United States was that it was a small price to pay for receiving the type of assistance necessary to withstand the Communist onslaught.

The examination of United States involvement in Greece can be made on two different levels: Greek-American relations and its impact on Greece; and US-Soviet relations and its impact on the Cold War. In other words, study of the Greek Civil War takes on both a narrow (national) and a broad (international) significance. This paper has endeavored to explain both, and provide a link between the two.

For the United States, the attraction of Greece was first and foremost its strategic location. It was an important linchpin to US foreign policy initiatives from the oil-rich Middle East, to Europe; and linked with Turkey, it held the key to the Mediterranean. Because of its strategic location it was in the best interest of the US to insure that it remained part of the "West." In the context of America's global battle with the Soviet Union, Greece was merely a pawn. It was the initial battleground of the Cold War, and served only as a means--an intermediate objective so to speak--on the way to the larger end. Political, economic, and military intervention in Greece were merely foreign policy instruments, and success there was critical to the "big picture." In a memo to Robert Lovett on October 20, 1948 the Secretary of State George Marshall commented:

"what is happening in Greece is merely an expression in keeping with the local circumstances of the general Soviet or Communist plot, and I think added pressure has been put on the case there because of the failures on other fronts. Incidentally, one evident influence on the minds of the Greek personnel and of our personnel is the natural tendency to ignore or forget that this is but a piece or a portion of the front of the general Soviet effort, and that what we do regarding Berlin or any other Communist effort, subversive or otherwise, has a direct effect on the effort in Greece, and contributes for or against its solution."<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the Greek Government was weak, sharply divided, and under assault from a leftist movement, made it a perfect candidate in which to apply the Truman Doctrine. Gradually, America's priorities in Greece became: 1) military victory over the communist insurgents, 2) political and economic stability, and 3) gradual reestablishment of freedoms, elections, etc., to coincide with reconstruction. America was never confused as to what the most important considerations were to its policy in Greece. Clearly, it was US interest, US interest, and US interest. How to go about serving that interest was the confusing issue. Finally, if there was a moral side to America's intervention in Greece, and I think there was, it was centered on our own beliefs and confidence in America, and was an extension of those ideas. Belief in our system, our freedoms, and our moral and ethical codes led us to believe that what was good for the United States was good for Greece. US policy makers truly felt

that the valid national interests of the United States and of Greece were not mutually exclusive. Therefore, the perception that anything we could give them would be better than what they had, was the most prevalent attitude among Americans.

What prompted US action in Greece, indeed what made intervention an immediate priority, was the deplorable condition of Greece in the economic, political, and military sectors, and the Greek Government's perceived inability to handle its own problems. In fact, the catastrophic conditions in Greece invited foreign interference. Although the end of WWII brought on many leftist and liberal initiatives throughout Europe, Greece seemed to be the most susceptible to a communist overthrow. On a moral level the US was concerned and fearful of a general collapse, and what it would mean for the people. On the "Realpolitik" level, US policy makers were certain that general collapse would be an invitation to the communist belligerents in the Civil War, and thus loss of Greece would symbolize a loss for the United States in the Cold War contest. Therefore, America made the conscious decision to not allow the Greek situation to fall to chance--it would intervene, and penetration would be all inclusive of the social, economic, political, and military institutions in Greece.

In a country torn apart by defeat, occupation, and civil war, the normal expectations and responsibilities of a "State" were no longer valid. The Greek political system had been a long suffering institution plagued by years of personality politics,

foreign intervention, corruption, partisanship, parochialism, and a host of other problems. It was unable to reform itself.

Additionally, there had been no military besides the token force in exile during the occupation years, and the officer corps had been cut to the bone. Finally, besides Russia, Greece was one of the most economically destitute countries to come out of WWII. When these problems combined to create a simultaneous burden to the country, there was little chance for survival unless Greece underwent a total institutional overhaul. In order to insure success, America intervened in a pervasive manner.

As one historian of the period commented: "Reading the dispatches today, it is difficult to believe that they were written by Americans representing their country in a foreign nation."<sup>3</sup> To be sure, America's conduct cannot be confused with anything other than unmitigated intervention and total penetration. There is no argument to that fact. Once America had decided to influence the situation in Greece via political, economic, and military means, it left a significant legacy. In the words of Mark Etheridge, the American representative to the United Nations in February 1947, "If [the State] Department feels Greece is vital to our policy, then nothing should be left undone."<sup>4</sup> This paper has endeavored to explore the reasons why America intervened, and what forces shaped and guided US intervention policy.

By 1947 it was apparent to the United States that the

situation in Greece was closely linked to the objective of containing communism worldwide. Its strategic location in the eastern Mediterranean, and its susceptibility to manipulation by foreign powers thrust it to the forefront in the battle between democracy and communism. As Theodore Couloumbis states in his book Foreign Interference in Greek Politics:

"For the theorist of Greek politics, the "causes" of domestic and foreign policies of Greece in the immediate postwar period, are better explained by an analysis of factors and forces in London, Washington, and Moscow rather than in Athens and on the Greek mountains."<sup>5</sup>

In the bipolar postwar world of 1947, America's ideological orientation stressed an unyielding opposition to all actions identified as Soviet or Marxist. It was a new world and new priorities were needed. As a ranking foreign service officer said in 1948:

"The problem was not so much that of saving the Greek people as that of preventing Greece from becoming a Soviet base and of permitting the impression to become prevalent that the United States is lacking in resolution when faced with aggression."<sup>6</sup>

Thus America's policy with respect to Greece indicated the degree of determination with which it would check Soviet expansion in other areas around the globe. In other words, in that new world

order of 1947, Greece was America's fight. The lines had already been drawn, and the challenge was real. Joseph Jones, one of those most responsible for drafting the Truman Doctrine, said it best when he explained that, "The Soviet Union had already divided the world and what we thought were British chestnuts were in fact our own."<sup>7</sup>

For foreign governments in the Western, democratic flock, internal security and alignment with the United States were the necessary ingredients of good government. For the time being at least, an emphasis on liberal democratic ideals and representative governments were relegated to a lower priority when stacked against opposing the Communist threat and actively countering real, or perceived, Soviet moves in the international arena. Thus, the collaboration of the United States with the most conservative and reactionary elements of Greece during this period was an almost inevitable development. The US saw the perpetuation of conservative governments in Greece as the only guarantee that its strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would not be adversely affected. An emergency situation called for an emergency strategy that could be invoked quickly, and "democratic ideals often stood in the way of efficiency and quick results."<sup>8</sup>

There were several important implications to American intervention for the United States. First, it brought out of the

closet the global struggle between democracy and communism, and exposed American desires to contain the Soviet Union, thus defining US foreign policy goals for the next 45 years. Secondly, intervention in Greece was an opportunity for America to demonstrate its resolve and commitment to preserving the balance of power and the existing order in the world. Additionally, intervention in Greece helped America shape its postwar foreign policy, and define its objectives along the lines of a practicalist, or realist approach. It also revealed the conflict between this realist approach and the moralist school, showing that the American interest would often collide with moral politics. Also, American intervention in Greece built a model for the relationship between superpower and small state that the US deemed necessary in order for it to meet its strategic goals. Finally, American intervention set the tone for future US involvement in other places around the world, established criteria for assessing the success or failure of future counter-insurgency operations, and developed new bureaucracies for future foreign assistance missions. With American intervention in Greece, the US developed an intermediate option to its foreign policy--a "halfway house" between paralysis and full-scale war.

In the 40 plus years since 1947, the United States has experienced numerous conflicts and has been involved in many aid programs, all undertaken to thwart the spread of communism and blunt the Soviet drive to widen its own sphere of influence. Each action was heavily influenced by America's experience in the



Greek Civil War, the precedents that were set with the Greek Aid program, and most definitely, by the Truman Doctrine. When President Ronald Reagan delivered the so called "Reagan Doctrine" in the 1980's, it was evident that the 1947 Truman Doctrine served as the basis. One of Reagan's staff, Charles Krauthammer, in describing the Reagan Doctrine stated: "The elements are simple: anti-communist revolution as a tactic. Containment as the strategy. And freedom as the rationale." He admitted that it was "simple" because it was 40 years in the making, spawned by the Truman Doctrine, and having risen out of the American experience in the Greek Civil War.'

American intervention also profoundly affected Greece, both in negative, and positive ways. Of major importance was the manner in which it influenced the political and military institutions, leaving a legacy that stayed with Greece until just recently.

American intervention in the Greek political system, which in the end resulted in the installation of a right-wing, hard-line, anti-communist government, actually did very little to correct some of the traditional problems. In fact, in many cases US involvement only increased the Greek propensity for partisan politics, personality-led politics, and a high degree of clientelism. The only change was that the US now played the role of patron state; thus the political lines were now drawn along lines of competition for American favors. Support for American

interests and solicitation for American involvement would, in turn, mean American support for an individual, or for a party. This support would secure for that individual or party a place in the government. This effect served to only widen the gap between political foes, weaken the institution, and fixated the Greek political system on waiting for "American solutions" to their problems. Although there were many Greeks in the system that were offended by American actions, the Greek reaction was usually "rejection in principle, acceptance in practice."

The emphasis placed by American policy makers on the creation of an army outside the control of the political leadership of Greece resulted in an autonomous military, free from civilian control. In an effort to strengthen the army and free it from the clasps of incompetent, ill-purposed politicians, the US policy makers actually encouraged this autonomy. Later, the Greek army would not hesitate to step into the political arena, exerting a tremendous amount of authority and influence over the government. As the United States pushed for a stronger military as the solution to the "bandit war," it was, in effect, assisting in the development of a fervent anti-communist fighting machine whose expertise was based on the destruction of an internal political and military threat. This was a major factor that led to the 1967 coup and Colonel's junta that terrorized Greece, setting back any political progress that had been made by several years.

Finally, one of the most damaging aspects of the Greek-

American relationship brought on by American intervention in the Civil War was the overall strategic considerations that led to the Truman Doctrine and American commitment in the Mediterranean. The linking of Greece and Turkey, and the lumping of both into the Mediterranean sphere of US strategic interests, created a confrontational situation that is still alive today. Both were pawns in America's grand strategy, and both vigorously competed for US attention and assistance, yet neither were treated as different entities, with different complexions, and different needs.

Lastly, and closely related to the Greek-Turkish problem, is the fact that most Greeks have the perception that the world owes them something for all the suffering experienced for the Allied cause. This perception then gives rise to an inferiority complex and a feeling that they are being constantly mistreated and misunderstood. Ambassador MacVeagh characterized this feeling in 1946 in a cable to the Secretary of State: "...the Greeks believe that they put up a finer resistance against the enemy in 1940 than any other small country and that the magnitude of their sufferings during the war has not been understood."<sup>10</sup> Of course, their complaint does have some validity when compared to Turkey's record in the two world wars.

**IN RETROSPECT**

"Greece is the test tube which the peoples of the whole world are watching in order to ascertain whether the determination of the Western powers to resist aggression equals that of international communism to acquire new territory and new bases for further aggression."<sup>11</sup>

Such was the assessment of the purpose of the American mission in Greece in 1948. By March 1949, it was clear that US military, economic, and political aid had been successful to the extent that it had prevented communist domination and control of Greece. In 1993, both Greece and the United States, while not without problems, are economically healthy and led by free, popularly elected governments, while the world has witnessed the dissolution of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the total breakup of the Soviet State. It is now more evident than ever before that the US interest has been served.

At the same time, Greece, over the longterm, has also greatly benefited from American assistance. The national interests of the United States and Greece are not, and were not, mutually exclusive. The protection of American interests in Greece has meant that the national interest of Greece was also protected. At the end of the Civil War, Greece was free from the communist threat, it had a stable government and strong army, and its economy was on the road to recovery. Today Greece is a member of two of the strongest, most stable organizations in the world--

NATO and the European Community. In retrospect, more than forty years later, there can be no other answer. For Greece in 1947--economically destitute, politically divided, and militarily broken--any other alternative meant a violent overthrow of the Government and the institution of a communist government by an armed minority. In Dean Acheson's words: "The importance of this achievement can only be fully understood when it is measured against what might have occurred if American assistance had not been provided. A Communist Greece...would have been a threat to the entire western world."

While in retrospect it appears that the United States could have accomplished its mission in Greece in a different manner; it also appears to be clear that the United States was totally successful in achieving all its goals and objectives, not only in the region, but in the global struggle against communism. With 20/20 hindsight we can now look back at the almost 50 years of Cold War, and bear witness to a strong America, a democratic and fully recovered Europe, and the fact that Soviet Communism and its expansionist policies are on the ashheap of history.

1. Smith, American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. XVI: Acheson, xi.; and Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 85.
2. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 164.
3. Roubatis, Tangled Webs.
4. FRUS, 1947, vol. V, 39.
5. Theodore A. Couloumbis, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976), 119.
6. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 12.
7. Jones, Fifteen Weeks, 188.
8. John Iatrides, "American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece," in Greek American Relations (New York: Pella, 1980), 63.
9. Gregory A. Fossedal, The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 152.
10. FRUS, 1946, vol. VII, 91.
11. FRUS, 1948, vol. IV, 12.

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## CURRICULUM VITAE

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### Service Record:

- Graduate of: Field Artillery Officer Basic Course; Pershing Missile Course; Infantry Officer Advanced Course; Combined Arms Services Staff School; Airborne School; Ranger School; Pathfinder Course; Air Assault School; Jumpmaster Course; Foreign Area Officer Course.
- Previous Assignments:
  - 1983-1986 Heilbronn, Germany;
    - 3-84 FA (Pershing), Plt Leader
    - 2-4 In, Rifle Plt Ldr/Asst Ops
  - 1987-1990 Ft Bragg, N.C. (82nd Airborne Div)
    - S-4, 1-325 Airborne In. Regt.
    - Commander Co.A, 1-325 A.I.R.
    - Commander HHC, 2nd Bde, 325 AIR
  - 1990-1993 Foreign Area Officer Program
    - Student, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, Ca.
    - Student, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
- Projected Assignment: 1993-1994, Exchange Officer Greek Army War College, Thessaloniki, Greece.

Personnel Data: Married--Kathy P. Calbos  
Children--Nickolas P. (7), and Christina V. (3)